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Government Lawyers and Their Private
"Clients" Under the Fair Housing Act
Eugene R. Gaetke*
& Robert G. Schwemm**
In strengthening enforcement of the federal Fair Housing Act, Congress
in the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act ("FHAA ") authorized government
lawyers from the Justice Department, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and state and local civil rights agencies to prosecute cases "on
behalf of' persons aggrieved by housing discrimination. This new enforce-
ment scheme has led to a heightened level of administrative complaints and
litigated cases in which government lawyers are put in the potentially difficult
position of having to represent both their agency and private complainants.
The "triangular" relationships created by the FHAA between government
lawyers and their public and private "clients" is not unique to fair housing
enforcement, but such relationships-whether they occur in private or govern-
mental practice-are always problematic for lawyers. The problems in fair
housing enforcement are made more difficult by the fact that Congress pro-
vided virtually no guidance as to how government lawyers are to resolve these
problems when a divergence of interests does arise between their employing
agency and their private "client."
Experience has shown that these potential conflicts may be quite real in
individual cases. When a divergence of interests has occurred, government
lawyers invariably have chosen to continue representing their public clients
while abandoning the private complainant. This result may leave victims of
housing discrimination with less protection than Congress envisioned
This Article analyzes how the rules governing professional conduct oper-
ate in analogous triangular relationships and then offers some insights as to
how the particular problems created by the administrative enforcement scheme
of the 1988 FHAA might be approached in light of these rules.
Introduction
In enacting the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 1
Congress attempted to strengthen the federal law that prohibits discrimina-
tion in housing by creating a new enforcement mechanism for handling ad-
ministrative complaints filed with the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUTD"). 2 As part of this effort, Congress provided that gov-
* H. Wendell Cherry Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A.,
J.D., University of Minnesota.
** Ashland Oil Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A., Amherst
College; J.D., Harvard University.
1 Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619. The FHAA amended the Fair Housing Act (Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968), Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 81 (1968). The Fair Hous-
ing Act, as amended by FHAA, is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994). For clarity, the first
version of the Fair Housing Act will be referred to as "Title VIII" or "FHA" and the 1988
amendments will be referred to as "FHAA."
2 See FHAA, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 8, 102 Stat. 1619, 1625-33 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3610-3612). The FHAA made other significant changes to the FHA; these changes included
adjustments in the prior law's enforcement provisions dealing with private lawsuits and cases
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ernment lawyers from HUD, from the Department of Justice ("Justice De-
partment," "Justice," or "DOJ"), and in certain circumstances, from various
state and local agencies would engage in litigation on behalf of persons ag-
grieved by housing discrimination.
3
These government lawyers are generally knowledgeable about fair hous-
ing law, experienced in litigating discrimination claims, and unfettered by the
economic demands of private practice. In pursuing FHAA claims, they offer
high quality, free legal assistance to individuals who have been victimized by
housing discrimination. Such litigation, brought by the government on behalf
of aggrieved individuals and prosecuted without cost to complainants, under-
standably appeals to those favoring strong enforcement of the antidiscrimina-
tion law. It is not surprising that this new scheme has resulted in a
heightened level of fair housing litigation and a shift from a privately domi-
nated system of enforcement to one in which the government plays a signifi-
cant role.
4
At the same time, however, the FHAA's approach has created signifi-
cant professional issues for the government lawyers, the agencies that employ
them, and the individuals on whose behalf they litigate. These problems arise
out of the "triangular" professional relationship created by Congress in di-
recting the lawyers, who are employed by and regularly represent the govern-
ment, to bring discrimination claims on behalf of private individuals.5 The
government lawyers prosecuting such cases face uncertainty as to which "cli-
ent" controls the litigation and how they might fulfill their duties of loyalty
and zealous representation. 6 Unfortunately, the Congress that enacted the
brought by the Attorney General, see § 8, 102 Stat. at 1625, 1633-35 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3613-3614), and the addition of "handicap" and "familial status" to Title VIII's list of prohib-
ited bases of discrimination, see § 6, 102 Stat. at 1620-22 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606).
See generally ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 5.3
(1996) (describing changes made by the FHAA to Title VIII).
3 See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. The FHAA requires referral of cases filed
with HUD to state and local agencies administering fair housing laws that are "substantially
equivalent" to the federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f)(3)(A); infra note 43 and accompanying
text. By 1996, these referrals accounted for well over half of HUD's caseload. See infra notes
96-99 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 80-95 and accompanying text. For a description of the pre-FHAA en-
forcement system of Title VIII, see Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Fair
Housing Act, 6 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 375 (1988).
5 "Triangular" professional relationships in governmental practice are not unprecedented.
See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
6 For a discussion of these issues, see infra Part III.A. Lawyers are required to be loyal to
their clients by avoiding conflicts of interest. The American Bar Association's ("ABA") 1983
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), for example, regulate legal representa-
tion in the face of conflicts arising from the interests of other present clients, see MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1996), and former clients, see id. Rule 1.9, the lawyer's
own interests, see id. Rule 1.7(b), and the interests of third persons, see id. Rules 1.7(b), 1.8(0,
among others. The ABA's prior Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code")
provided similar regulation of conflicts of interest. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101 (1980) (lawyer's own interests); id. DR 5-105 (interests of another
client); id. DR 5-107 (interest of third persons). Similarly, both codes of legal ethics require
lawyers to act with zeal in representing their clients. See id. DR 7-101 (compelling zeal in repre-
sentation); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.1, 1.3 (demanding that lawyers
provide competent and diligent representation).
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FHAA did not address these issues.7 The result has been that well into the
1990s, after years of litigation experience under this legislation, a senior Jus-
tice Department official was still lamenting that FHAA cases put the DOJ in
a situation that "raises a lot of difficult ethical issues."
8
Without any legislative guidance, the resolution of these professional is-
sues has necessarily been left to the lawyers and the agencies that employ
them. Given certain practical realities facing these lawyers and their agen-
cies,9 it is not surprising that the aggrieved persons in such litigation may
receive substantially less legal "representation" than they might expect and
perhaps than Congress intended. The FHAA, therefore, illustrates the need
for more careful legislation by Congress when it chooses to enforce public
policy by authorizing governmental litigation on behalf of private parties.
Unless Congress provides better statutory guidance to the agencies and the
government lawyers charged with pursuing such litigation, the effectiveness
of this enforcement tool will necessarily be hampered by the agencies' limita-
tions on the legal assistance provided to private complainants.
This Article explores the ethical issues created by the use of government
lawyers to bring actions on behalf of aggrieved individuals under the FHAA.
Part I describes the FHAA's enforcement system and the goals that Congress
intended to achieve by substituting it for the prior scheme. Part II identifies
a number of situations in which government lawyers responsible for prose-
cuting FHAA cases may find themselves in a conflict between their public
and private "clients." Part III examines the treatment of such conflicts in
analogous triangular professional relationships, offers thoughts about how
government lawyers involved in FHAA litigation should act to minimize
their ethical problems, and suggests changes to the law that would help to
alleviate the problems.
I. Background: Enforcing Fair Housing
A. Title VIII's Inadequacies
The origins of the FHAA can be traced to the early 1970s when congres-
sional hearings began to call attention to the inadequacies of Title VIII's en-
forcement scheme.10 Although Title VIII provided three methods of
enforcement (suits by the Attorney General,' administrative complaints to
HUD, 12 and court actions brought by private plaintiffs13), severe limitations
7 See infra Part II.B.
8 DO Official Discusses Evidentiary Issues in Lending Bias Litigation, 11 [Bulletin 5] Fair
Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 1 5.13, at 19 (May 1, 1995) (quoting Joseph D.
Rich, Deputy Chief, Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, Civil Rights Division, DOJ).
9 See infra Part II.C.
10 See generally Federal Government's Role in the Achievement of Equal Opportunity in
Housing: Hearings Before the Civil Rights Oversight Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 92d Cong. (1971).
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1982), amended by Federal Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994)).
12 See id. § 3610.
13 See id. § 3612. A fourth category of litigation generated by Title VIII-private suits
against HUD and other federal agencies for violating their affirmative fair housing duties under
1997]
The George Washington Law Review
on the governmental actions left enforcement of the law largely to private
complainants.1
4
Title VIII authorized the Attorney General to sue only when a defend-
ant engaged in a "pattern or practice" of discrimination or when a group of
persons were discriminated against in a way that raised "an issue of general
public importance."' 5 These phrases limited the Justice Department to pros-
ecuting cases that had "a measurable public impact."'16 In addition, several
courts limited the Attorney General's authority in these cases to seeking eq-
uitable relief, which meant that the Justice Department could not obtain
monetary damages and other individualized relief for the victims of discrimi-
nation.17 In an early Title VIII case, the Supreme Court described the role of
the Attorney General in enforcing the statute as "minimal."' 8 Indeed, in the
seven years that preceded enactment of the FHAA, the Justice Department
brought an average of only ten fair housing cases per year.19
The enforcement powers given to HUD by Title VIII were even more
restricted. If HUD received a complaint from an aggrieved person in a state
or locality with a fair housing law that was "substantially equivalent" to Title
VIII, it was required to refer that complaint to the relevant state or local
authorities for processing.20 For those cases that were not referred, HUD
was given thirty days to investigate the complaint, after which it was author-
ized to attempt to resolve the dispute only by using "informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion.' If these methods failed, the stat-
ute authorized the complainant to bring a private lawsuit for injunctive relief
42 U.S.C. § 3608-was not explicitly authorized by the statute, but could be pursued under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). See, e.g., NAACP v. HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 157 (1st Cir.
1987) (holding that the APA allows federal courts to review claims that the Secretary of HUD is
not affirmatively furthering the purposes of Title VIII). See generally SCHWEMm, supra note 2,
§ 21.3 (summarizing cases that allowed review of 42 U.S.C. § 3608 actions under the APA). In
addition, a separate section of the 1968 Fair Housing Act provided criminal sanctions for fair
housing violations that were accompanied by "force or the threat of force." See 42 U.S.C. § 3631
(1982); see, eg., United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315, 321 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding convic-
tions under 42 U.S.C. § 3631 for racial intimidation).
14 See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,209 (1972) ("[C]omplaints by
private persons are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act."); Robert G.
Schwemm, Federal Fair Housing Enforcement: A Critique of the Reagan Administration's Record
and Recommendations for the Future, in CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON CIVIL Rorrs, ONE NATION,
INDIVISIBLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGE FOR THE 1990s 268, 269-71 (Reginald C. Govan &
William L. Taylor eds., 1989); infra notes 28, 35 and accompanying text.
15 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1982).
16 United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 217 (4th Cir. 1972).
17 See United States v. Rent-A-Homes Sys., 602 F.2d 795, 797-98 (7th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151, 1155
(4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Orlofsky, 538 F. Supp. 450, 452-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
18 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211.
19 See Schwemm, supra note 14, at 277.
20 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c). Some 36 states and 79 localities qualified for such referrals by 1988.
See SCHWEMM, supra note 2, app. at C-2.1 to -4.
21 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a). The original version of the bill that became Title VIII included
among HUD's powers the authority to issue "cease and desist" orders, but as a result of an
amendment sponsored by Senator Dirksen, this authority was eliminated in favor of "informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." See SCHWEMM, supra note 2, § 24.2, at
24-3.
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in federal court,22 an option that was already available without the prerequi-
site of an administrative complaint.23 These restrictions resulted in an agency,
procedure that provided no sanctions against recalcitrant defendants and no
apparent advantages to complainants. In its first review of this procedure,
the Supreme Court observed that "HUD has no power of enforcement." 24
Title VIII also authorized persons aggrieved by discrimination to pro-
ceed directly to court without first filing a HUD complaint or otherwise pur-
suing administrative remedies.25 Aggrieved persons could bring these cases
in state or federal court, and the authorized relief included equitable orders,
actual damages, punitive damages of up to $1000, and attorney's fees to pre-
vailing plaintiffs who were financially unable to assume them.26 Despite
these limitations on punitive damages and fee awards, the remedies available
in a direct suit were clearly superior to those available in a HUD
proceeding.27
By the end of the 1970s, the flaws in the Title VIII enforcement scheme
were apparent. In testimony delivered in 1979, the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Civil Rights noted that:
[T]he principal impediment to realization of the purposes of the
Fair Housing Act has been the lack of adequate enforcement au-
thority.... Comparatively few suits have been brought by "ag-
grieved persons," in large part because lawsuits may be time-
consuming and expensive. Few victims of discrimination actually
sue when HUD conciliation efforts fail, and conciliation frequently
fails because the Secretary has no authority to institute actions to
support positions taken in conciliation efforts.28
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d). At least one court held that this provision did not authorize a
damage award in suits growing out of HUD complaints. See Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033,
1036 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
23 See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
24 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 3612; Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 104-06
(1979).
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a), (c).
27 See SCHWEMM, supra note 2, § 24.2, at 24-4. As then-Justice Rehnquist observed in
1979: "Given the advantages to the claimant of proceeding under [the direct lawsuit route of]
§ 812, it is hard to imagine why anyone would voluntarily proceed [to file a HUD complaint]
under § 810 if both routes were equally available." Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 125 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
28 Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2540 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 4 (1979) (testi-
mony of Drew S. Days III, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, DOJ). At the
same time, HUD Secretary Patricia Roberts Harris noted:
[The Fair Housing Act of 1968] identified the problems but supplied only the most
pallid of solutions. It defined and prohibited discriminatory housing practices but
failed to include the enforcement tools necessary to prevent such practices and pro-
vide relief to victims of discrimination.
It provided HUD no cease and desist authority.
It limited the enforcement authority of the Attorney General to pattern or
practice suits and precluded civil actions on behalf of single individuals.
As an inadequate substitute for HUD or Justice Department enforcement au-
1997]
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Nevertheless, thousands of persons aggrieved by discriminatory housing
practices brought their complaints to HUD every year. In 1979, for example,
over 2800 administrative complaints were filed, and this figure increased by
sixty percent in the next eight years.29 These figures greatly exceeded the
number of direct private lawsuits filed under Title VIII.3° Thus, despite its
vast shortcomings, the simplicity and ease of the administrative complaint
procedure apparently appealed to victims of housing discrimination far more
than the process of retaining a lawyer and filing a lawsuit. The result was that
the administrative process-the weakest of Title VIII's three enforcement
mechanisms-was the one most often used.
B. The Congressional Response
By 1978, bills giving HUD greater enforcement power were the subject
of committee hearings in both the House and Senate.31 For the next ten
years, Congress considered a variety of proposals to amend Title VIII, each
of which featured a stronger HUD enforcement scheme.32 During this time,
the need to make the administrative process more effective was underscored
by the fact that racial discrimination in housing was shown to be continuing
at alarming levels.33
The Congress that enacted the FHAA felt that Title VIII was unable "to
fulfill the promise made to the American people 20 years ago. '34 According
to the House Judiciary Committee's report on the FHAA:
Existing law has been ineffective because it lacks an effective en-
forcement mechanism. Private persons and fair housing organiza-
tions are burdened with primary enforcement responsibility.
Although private enforcement has achieved some success, it is re-
stricted by the limited financial resources of litigants and the bar,
and by disincentives in the law itself. The Federal enforcement role
is severely limited 5
thority, it provided limited and confusing private litigation rights and negligible
monetary damages.
Id. at 70 (statement of Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary, HUD).
29 See Schwemm, supra note 14, at 291.
30 Some 400 private Title VIII lawsuits were reported in the twenty years after enactment
of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, for an average of about 20 such suits per year. See Schwemm,
supra note 4, at 381.
31 See Fair Housing Act: Hearings on H.R. 3504 and H.R. 7787 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1978); HUD
Attorney's Fees: Hearing on S. 571 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1978).
32 See SCHWEMM, supra note 2, § 5.3(2), nn.50, 52-55 (citing various bills introduced be-
tween 1980 and 1987).
33 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 15 nn.10-13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2173, 2176 (citing national and local studies that showed housing discrimination).
34 Id. at 13, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2174.
35 Id. at 16, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2177.
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The FHAA was intended to change this by creating "an administrative en-
forcement mechanism, so the federal government can and will take an active
role in enforcing the law."
36
The same themes were sounded in the Senate. Senator Kennedy, the
bill's chief sponsor, stated that the existing law is "a toothless tiger. It recog-
nizes a fundamental right; but it fails to provide a meaningful remedy. '37 The
FHAA, he said, would "put real teeth into the fair housing laws by giving
HUD real enforcement authority. s38 Senator Specter, the principal Republi-
can sponsor, noted that many aggrieved parties could not finance the cost of
litigation, so they "simply have no remedy to effectuate that right. '3 9 He
concluded that Title VIII provided "no effective remedy," but that the "expe-
ditious enforcement proceeding" created by the FHAA would "realistically
enshrine the right which was created two decades ago [by] finally bringing to
bear an effective remedy." 4
The basic goal of the FHAA's new enforcement scheme, therefore, was
to provide an effective administrative option for persons aggrieved by hous-
ing discrimination who could not or did not want to file their own private
lawsuits. This option was intended to combine the more appealing elements
of the prior administrative system-the ease, simplicity, and lack of expense
involved in filing an administrative complaint-with the enforcement "teeth"
of a private lawsuit in which an aggrieved person would be represented by
counsel and could obtain damages and other appropriate relief.
C. Enforcement Under the FHAA
The FHAA's administrative procedure provides for the prompt determi-
nation of fair housing disputes and for serious sanctions and remedies when a
violation is shown. The system is somewhat complicated. Complaints to
HUD may be filed by any person who claims to have been aggrieved by a
discriminatory housing practice.41 HUD is also authorized to file complaints
on its own behalf.42 In addition, the FHAA incorporated Title VIII's use of
state and local agencies: complaints that come from a state or locality with a
36 Id. at 17, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2178. Congressman Edwards, the
FHAA's principal sponsor in the House, noted that victims of housing discrimination
are often poor and they cannot afford to be the plaintiff in Federal Court. Under
the amendment [that eventually became the FHAA], the HUD Secretary is the
plaintiff, and that is how it should be.
As in other civil rights laws, the Government does the enforcing. We do not
force the individual to enforce the Federal law.
134 CONrG. Rac. 15,850 (1988) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
37 134 CONo. REc. 19,711 (1988). Senator Dole also remarked that the current law is
"without its teeth," because it "relies on voluntary conciliation and persuasion." Id. at 19,724.
38 Id. at 19,711 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Senator Specter agreed, remarking that the
bill's new administrative remedy "puts teeth in the existing laws." Id. at 19,882.
39 Id. at 19,882.
40 Id. at 19,716 (statement of Sen. Specter).
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (1994). An "aggrieved person" is defined as any per-
son who claims to have been injured by or is about to be injured by a discriminatory housing
practice outlawed by the statute. See id. § 3602(i).
42 See id § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i).
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fair housing law that is "substantially equivalent" to the FIHAA must be re-
ferred to the appropriate state or local agency for handling. 43
Complaints that are not referred to state or local agencies remain the
responsibility of HUD, which has 100 days to conduct an investigation and to
determine whether "reasonable cause" exists to believe that a discriminatory
housing practice occurred or is about to occur.44 Also during this one hun-
dred-day period, HUD must engage in conciliation efforts with the respon-
dent and the complainant "to the extent feasible." 45 In addition, if HUD
determines that a particular case requires prompt judicial action, HUD may
refer that case to the Justice Department, which is then required to file a
lawsuit seeking appropriate temporary or preliminary relief. 46 Furthermore,
if the case involves a challenge to a local land-use law, it must be referred to
the Justice Department for prosecution. 47
If the case is not conciliated and if HUD determines that reasonable
cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice occurred or is
about to occur, the FHAA directs HUD to "immediately issue a charge on
behalf of the aggrieved person."48 At this stage, either the complainant or
the respondent may elect to have the case decided in a federal district court.
49
If either party makes an election, the Justice Department is required within
thirty days of the election to "commence and maintain[ ] a civil action on
behalf of the aggrieved person,"50 which may result in the same types of relief
that are available in privately initiated lawsuits (equitable orders and actual
and punitive damages to the person aggrieved by the discriminatory housing
practice).5 ' In such a case, the statute authorizes any aggrieved person to
43 See id. § 3610(f). In order to qualify for such referrals, a state or local agency must be
administering a fair housing law that is substantially equivalent to the FHAA in four respects:
(1) the substantive rights covered; (2) the procedures followed; (3) the remedies available; and
(4) the availability of judicial review. See id. § 3610(f)(3)(A); ScHwEMM, supra note 2, § 24.5(2).
By continuing Title VIII's practice of referring HUD complaints to states and localities with
substantially equivalent fair housing laws, Congress "recognize[d] the valuable role state and
local agencies play in the enforcement process." H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 35 (1988), reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2176.
44 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(). HUD must complete its investigation within this 100-day time
limit "unless it is impracticable to do so." Id. § 3610(a)(/)(B)(iv).
45 Id. § 3610(b)(1).
46 See id. § 3610(e)(1). Unlike the other litigation that may result from a HUD complaint
pursuant to §§ 3610-3612, a "prompt judicial action" maintained by the Justice Department
under § 3610(e)(1) is not explicitly brought "on behalf of' the aggrieved person. Cf. id.
§ 3610(g)(2)(A) (authorizing Secretary upon reasonable cause determination to issue a charge
for further proceedings "on behalf of aggrieved person"); id. § 3612(o)(1) (authorizing Attorney
General to bring a civil action "on behalf of aggrieved person").
47 See id. § 3610(g)(2)(C).
48 Id. § 3610(g)(2)(A).
49 See id. § 3612(a), (o). This election procedure was inserted late in the legislative process
in order to protect the parties' constitutional right to trial by jury. See infra notes 170-173 and
accompanying text.
50 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o)(1).
51 See id. § 3612(o)(3). The relief in both elected and nonelected cases may include an
award of attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party, other than the United States. See id.
§ 3612(p).
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intervene "as of right,"52 although such intervention is not required for the
aggrieved person to obtain relief.53
If the case is not elected to court, it will be prosecuted by HUD law-
yers54 and will be tried before a HUD-appointed administrative law judge
("AL") not later than 120 days after the charge was filed.55 The ALJ is
required to decide the case within sixty days after the hearing and may award
actual damages to the aggrieved person, civil penalties of up to $50,000 to the
government, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. 56 These AIU decisions are
subject to review by the Secretary of HUD and ultimately by the courts of
appeal.57 The statute also authorizes any aggrieved person to intervene as a
party in the HUD proceeding,58 although such intervention is not required
for that person to obtain relief.
59
The FHAA, like the original FHA, gives private complainants the op-
tion of by-passing this entire administrative procedure and going directly to
court, where they may be awarded equitable relief, actual and punitive dam-
ages, and attorney's fees.60 Indeed, the FHAA makes this option more at-
tractive and easier to use by extending the statute of limitations for private
litigants from 180 days to two years61 and by eliminating the $1000 cap on
punitive damages62 and the "financial inability" limitation on attorney's fees
awards.63
The FHAA also authorizes the Justice Department to intervene in pri-
vate cases if the Attorney General certifies that the case is "of general public
importance."64 Conversely, an aggrieved person may intervene in a "pattern
52 Id. § 3612(o)(2).
53 See id. § 3612(o)(3). The only exception to this rule is that monetary relief "sought for
the benefit of an aggrieved person who does not intervene" may not be awarded if that person
"has not complied with discovery orders entered by the court." Id.
54 See 24 C.F.R. § 103.410(c) (1996); Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988,54 Fed. Reg. 3232,3257-58 (1989). HUD's role in such cases is to seek "appropriate
relief for an aggrieved party and vindication of the public interest." 24 C.F.R. § 104.200(a)(1).
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b), (g)(1). The 120-day time limit need not be observed if "it is
impracticable to do so." Id. § 3612(g)(1).
56 See id. § 3612(g)(2)-(3), (p). The top civil penalty is $10,000 for respondents who have
not been adjudged to have committed any prior discriminatory housing practices; higher limits of
up to $50,000 are provided for respondents who have committed previous discriminatory prac-
tices. See id. § 3612(g)(3).
57 See id. § 3612(h)-(i).
58 See id. § 3612(c).
59 Although the statute authorizes denial of actual damages to a person who fails to com-
ply with discovery orders in an elected case, see supra note 53, no analogous provision applies to
an aggrieved person who has not complied with discovery orders in a HUD proceeding.
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 3613. A complainant may also file both a HUD complaint and a private
lawsuit. In these circumstarfces, the first one to reach a hearing will control. See id. §§ 3612(0,
3613(a)(3). Also, a conciliation agreement consented to by an aggrieved person in a HUD pro-
ceeding will bar that person from bringing a private action based on the same discriminatory
housing practice. See id. § 3613(a)(2).
61 See id. § 3613(a)(1)(A); cf id. § 3612(a) (1982).
62 See id. § 3613(c)(1) (1994); cf. id. § 3612(c) (1982).
63 See id. § 3613(c)(2) (1994); cf id. § 3612(c) (1982).
64 Id. § 3613(e) (1994).
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or practice" suit65 brought by the Justice Department and may obtain any
relief in that suit that would be available in a private case.66 Even without
such intervention, the Justice Department is authorized by the FHAA to
seek monetary damages for aggrieved persons and civil penalties of up to
$100,000 for the government in "pattern or practice" cases, in addition to the
equitable relief that Title VIII has always authorized in such cases. 67
The ultimate effect of the FHAA was to considerably expand the gov-
ernment's role in the enforcement of fair housing. Not only is the govern-
ment now expected to pursue cases of public significance as it was under the
prior law, but it is also directed to prosecute claims of housing discrimination
on behalf of private individuals.
In establishing this enforcement scheme, Congress provided two primary
settings in which federal government lawyers must pursue the interests of
private complainants alleging harm from housing discrimination: (1) HUD
lawyers must prosecute private complaints in proceedings before administra-
tive law judges within that agency; and (2) Justice Department lawyers must
take over these cases when they are "elected" to court.68 Through the
FHAA, Congress placed much of the burden of private fair housing enforce-
ment squarely on the shoulders of these federal government lawyers.69 At
the same time, however, Congress created some troubling professional issues
for these lawyers.
These issues arise because of the "triangular" professional relationship
presented by HUD-charged cases. The three vertices of that triangle consist
of the government lawyer providing the representation, the lawyer's usual
governmental client,70 and the private complainant on whose behalf the case
65 A "pattern or practice" case requires the government to prove that the defendant dis-
criminated on a regular basis as opposed to in an "isolated or accidental or peculiar" way.
United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971) (internal quota-
tion marks and citations omitted); see SCHWEMM, supra note 2, § 26.2(2).
66 See 42 U.S.C. § 3614(e) (1994).
67 See id. § 3614(d)(1); cf id. § 3613 (1982). The top civil penalty is $50,000 for respon-
dents who have not committed a prior violation; the $100,000 penalty is available for subsequent
violations. See id. § 3614(d)(1)(C) (1994).
68 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the Justice Department's role in
"prompt judicial actions" that grow out of HUD administrative complaints). In addition, in
"pattern or practice" cases, Justice Department lawyers are authorized to seek monetary relief
on behalf of aggrieved persons. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. These cases may also
raise some of the same types of professionalism issues for DOJ lawyers that occur in HUD-
charged cases, but because "pattern or practice" cases are not brought "on behalf of" aggrieved
persons, see supra note 46, and because they are relatively few in number, see infra note 93, they
are not the focus of this Article.
69 Lawyers representing state and local fair housing agencies have similar responsibilities
under the FHAA because complaints filed with HUD must be referred to state and local agen-
cies that have laws "substantially equivalent" to the FHAA. See supra note 43 and accompany-
ing text. In order to be certified as "substantially equivalent" to the FHAA, a state or local law
would need to provide governmental legal representation to private individuals aggrieved by
housing discrimination. See supra note 43. Although this Article focuses primarily on the pro-
fessional issues confronted by HUD and DOJ lawyers in pursuing the claims of aggrieved indi-
viduals under the FHAA, government lawyers providing similar services under state and local
laws face the same issues.
70 The identification of the actual "client" of a government lawyer is itself a rather troub-
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is brought. These professional relationships necessarily generate pressures
on the lawyers' loyalty, zeal, and control of litigation. These are the pres-
sures that have caused the government lawyers acting under the FHAA to
feel uncertain about their role.7 '
The FHAA's system of having the government maintain actions "on
behalf of" private complainants is not unprecedented, although it does fea-
ture certain unique elements. A number of other federal statutes, including
some dealing with civil rights enforcement, authorize government suits based
on complaints from private individuals.72 On rare occasions, these statutes,
like the FHAA, specifically provide that the suits are to be brought "on be-
half of' these private persons.73 In the employment discrimination field-the
area most often analogized to fair housing 74-the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission ("EEOC") is authorized to bring cases prompted by
private complaints under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"). 75 In
contrast to the government's role under the FHAA, however, the EEOC has
discretion over whether to file such suits, and these suits are not specified as
being brought "on behalf of' the complaining individuals.76
The FHAA, therefore, is unique among federal statutes in mandating
that a complainant's suit be brought by the government automatically upon a
finding of reasonable cause 77 and in authorizing government suits for sub-
ling professional issue. For further discussion of this issue, see infra note 196 and accompanying
text.
71 See supra text accompanying note 8; infra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
72 For examples of such federal civil rights statutes, see 20 U.S.C. § 1706 (1994) (authoriz-
ing the Attorney General to file suit on behalf of individuals who are denied equal educational
opportunities); 42 U.S.C. § 2000b(a) (1994) (authorizing the Attorney General to file suit to
desegregate public facilities if the complainant is unable to maintain a private suit); id. § 2000c-6
(authorizing the Attorney General to file suit to desegregate schools when the complainant is
unable to maintain a private suit); id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (authorizing the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission or the Attorney General to file suit based on a charge of unlawful em-
ployment practice brought by a private individual).
For examples of federal statutes outside of the civil rights arena, see 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b)(2)
(1994) (authorizing the Secretary of Labor to bring suit on behalf of employees to recover dam-
ages resulting from employer violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act); id. § 482(b) (au-
thorizing the Secretary of Labor to bring suit to set aside invalid election upon a finding of
probable cause after the investigation of a union member's complaint); id. § 660(c)(2) (authoriz-
ing the Secretary of Labor to file suit when the investigation of an employee's complaint shows
that the employer has discharged or discriminated against the employee for exercising rights
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, with available relief to include restraining orders
and "all appropriate relief including rehiring or reinstatement.., with back pay").
73 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1706 (authorizing civil suits for individuals denied equal educa-
tional opportunities and providing that the Attorney General "for or in the name of the United
States, may also institute such a civil action on behalf of such an individual").
74 The similar goals and substantive language of the federal employment discrimination
and fair housing laws have led courts to rely regularly on precedents from employment discrimi-
nation law in interpreting the FHA. See SCHwEMM, supra note 2, § 7.2(3), at 7-5 to 7-7.
75 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
76 See id.; see also General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 & n.8 (1980) ("When the
EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to
vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination.").
77 See supra notes 48, 50-51 and accompanying text.
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stantial money damages "on behalf of' private individuals.78 In short, the
FHAA pushed the concept of governmental enforcement of private rights to
a new level.79
D. Experience with the FHAA
The FHAA has had a significant impact on the enforcement of fair hous-
ing law. The new system has generated a much higher number of fair hous-
ing complaints than occurred under Title VIII.80 This higher complaint load
has produced a substantial number of HUD-charged cases, in which govern-
ment lawyers face the dilemma of having to act on behalf of the complainant
while still pursuing the interests of their agency-employer.
In the 1980s, before the FHAA became effective, the number of Title
VIII complaints received by HUD was generally in the range of 4000 to 5000
per year.81 This number rose dramatically after enactment of the FHAA. In
1989, a then record number of 7174 administrative complaints was filed
under the FHA, an increase of sixty-two percent over the 1988 figure.82 In
1990, this figure rose to 7675,83 and in 1991 it jumped to 9320.84 Thereafter,
78 See supra notes 48, 50-51, 56 and accompanying text. By way of contrast, the Title VII
suits that the EEOC is authorized to bring may seek only monetary awards for back pay and
other equitable remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), (g)(1).
79 In a few situations (generally involving criminal defense work), Congress provides that
attorneys employed by the government are to represent private individuals. See, eg., 10 U.S.C.
§ 827 (requiring judge advocates of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and law spe-
cialists of the Coast Guard to be detailed to serve as defense counsel); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(g)(2)(A) (authorizing attorneys employed by the Federal Public Defender Organiza-
tion to represent criminal defendants).
80 See infra notes 81-95 and accompanying text. Some, but not all, of this increase in com-
plaint levels is due to the fact that the FHAA added two new categories-familial status and
handicap-to Title VIII's list of prohibited bases of discrimination. See supra note 2. For exam-
ple, in 1990 (the first full year of FHAA enforcement), 2056 complaints to HUD alleged familial
status discrimination, and 1088 complaints alleged handicap discrimination. The total number of
complaints in the other five categories was 6957, an increase of about 57% over the figure for
1988 (the last full year before the FHAA became effective). See OFFIcE OF FAIR Hous. &
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING
1990: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECION 808(E)(2) OF THE FAIR HOUSING Acr
5-6 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 HUD REPORT].
81 See Schwemm, supra note 14, at 291. In 1988, for example, HUD received a total of
4422 Title VIII complaints. See OFFICE OF FAIR Hous. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. DEP'T OF
Hous. & URBAN DEV., THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING 1989: REPORT TO THE CONoRESS PURSU-
ANT TO SECION 808(E)(2) OF THE FAIR HOUSING AcT 13 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 HUD
REPORT].
The complaint levels described here and throughout this textual paragraph refer to the total
number of complaints filed with HUD under the FHA, which includes complaints referred to
state and local fair housing agencies as well as those retained by HUD. For a break-down of
these total complaint figures into categories of complaints that were referred to state and local
agencies and those that were retained by HUD, see infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
82 See 1989 HUD REPORT, supra note 81, at 13. About 95% of these complaints were filed
after the FHAA became effective on March 12, 1989. See id. Of the 7174 complaints filed in
1989, 3952 fell within HUD's jurisdiction, and 3222 fell within the jurisdiction of state and local
agencies. See id. The comparable figures for 1988 were 1255 complaints falling within HUD's
jurisdiction and 3167 within the jurisdiction of state and local agencies. See id.
83 See 1990 HUD REPORT, supra note 80, at 6. Of the 7675 complaints filed in 1990, 4457
fell within HUD's jurisdiction, and 3218 fell within the jurisdiction of state and local agencies.
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the numbers leveled off somewhat to 9461 complaints filed in 1992,85 10,184
in 1993,86 and 9670 in 1994,87 the last year for which official statistics are
available.
This growth in the HUD complaint load was eventually reflected in a
substantial number of "reasonable cause" determinations 88 and charges on
behalf of aggrieved persons. By the end of 1994, HUD issued cause determi-
nations in a total of 947 cases, with the yearly figures-19 in 1989; 81 in 1990;
157 in 1991; 154 in 1992; 211 in 1993; and 325 in 1994-showing a clear pat-
tern of growth.89 Although these cause determinations represent only a small
percentage of the overall HUD complaint load,90 their overall numbers have
See id. These figures and those for previous years were reported by HUD on a calendar year
basis. HUD later decided to report these figures on a fiscal year basis. For Fiscal Year 1990,
HUD reported a total of 7675 complaints, of which 4457 fell within HUD's jurisdiction and 3218
were within the jurisdiction of state and local agencies. See OFFICE OF PROGRAM STANDARDS &
EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T'OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., 1993 CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON FAIR HOUSING PROGRAMS 17 (1995) [hereinafter 1993 HUD REPORT].
84 See OFFIcE OF FAIR Hous. & EQUAL OPPORTUNnrY, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN
DEV., THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING 1991: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECnON
808(E)(2) OF ma FAIR HOUSING AcT 6 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 HUD REPORT]. Of the 9320
complaints filed in the 1991 calendar year, 5657 fell within HUD's jurisdiction and 3663 fell
within the jurisdiction of state and local agencies. See id For Fiscal Year 1991, HUD received a
total of 9192 complaints, of which 5734 fell within HUD's jurisdiction and 3458 fell within the
jurisdiction of state and local agencies. See 1993 HUD REPORT, supra note 83, at 11, 17.
85 See OFFicE OF FAIR Hous. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN
DEv., THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING 1992: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECION
808(E)( 2 ) OF TnE FAIR HOUSING AcT 5 (1994) [hereinafter 1992 HUD REPORT]. Of the 9461
complaints filed in 1992, 6352 fell within HUD's jurisdiction and 3109 fell within the jurisdiction
of state and local agencies. See id. at 6.
86 See 1993 HUD REPORT, supra note 83, at 11. Of the 10,184 complaints filed in 1993,
6131 fell within HUD's jurisdiction and 4053 fell within the jurisdiction of state and local agen-
cies. See id. at 17.
87 See OFFIcE OF PROGRAM STANDARDS & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN
DEv., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAIR HOUSING PROGRAMS 12 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter 1994 HUD REPORT]. Of the 9670 complaints filed in 1994, 4884 fell within HUD's jurisdic-
tion and 4786 fell within the jurisdiction of state and local agencies. See id. at 15-16.
88 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
89 See 1989 HUD REPORT, supra note 81, at 18; 1990 HUD REPORT, supra note 80, at 8;
1991 HUD REPORT, supra note 84, at 12; 1992 HUD REPORT, supra note 85, at 8; 1993 HUD
REPORT, supra note 83, at 18; 1994 HUD REPORT, supra note 87, at 17.
90 As a case proceeds through the HUD system, it may ultimately be resolved in one of
four main ways. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIms, THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS Acr OF
1988: THE ENFORCEMENT REPORT 37-47 (1994) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. These are:
(1) formal conciliation with HUD as a party; (2) withdrawal, either with or without a formal
resolution among the private parties without HUD as a signatory; (3) administrative closure (i.e.,
dismissal for reasons such as HUD's inability to locate the complainant or to obtain essential
information); and (4) a cause or no-cause determination. See id.
There are other ways by which a HUD complaint may be disposed. For example, the
FHAA requires HUD to refer complaints involving the legality of zoning and other land-use
laws to the Justice Department. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Justice has discretion
over whether to file such cases under its § 3614 litigation authority; through 1993, it had chosen
to sue in 14 of the 93 zoning and land-use complaints referred to it by HUD. See COMMISSION
REPORT, supra, at 174, 205-06.
HUD may also refer cases to Justice that require "prompt judicial action" (i.e., a temporary
restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction). See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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eventually come to be quite substantial and to constitute a huge caseload for
government lawyers.91
Well over half of these HUD-charged cases have been "elected" to
court,92 thus making their prosecution the responsibility of Justice Depart-
ment lawyers. 93 By the end of 1994, elections occurred in a total of 608 cases,
with yearly figures as follows: 4 in 1989; 62 in 1990; 97 in 1991; 93 in 1992; 132
in 1993; and 220 in 1994.94 Thus, over sixty percent of the cases in which
HUD issued a charge were elected, and this rate has remained fairly constant
throughout the history of the FHAA.95
State and local fair housing agencies have come to play an increasingly
important role in handling FHAA complaints. The statute requires that
HUD complaints be referred to such agencies if they have a fair housing law
that is "substantially equivalent" to the FHAA.96 In the six-year period from
Unlike zoning and land-use cases, however, a prompt judicial action referral does not remove
the case from HUD's jurisdiction; instead, the administrative process and the prompt judicial
action proceed simultaneously. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see, eg., HUD v.
Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 867 (11th Cir. 1990). Through December 6, 1993, HUD had referred a
total of 35 prompt judicial action cases to Justice, the majority of which were settled by consent
order or conciliation prior to a hearing. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at 208-09.
91 For the purposes of this Article, the cause-determination-and-charge stage is a crucial
point in the administrative process, because at this stage HUD perceives that its duty to "repre-
sent" the complainant begins. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at 38. A "no cause"
determination, on the other hand, results in HUD's dismissal of the complaint. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 3610(g)(3) (1994); 24 C.F.R. § 103A00(a)(1), (2)(ii) (1996). HUD does not allow an appeal of
this determination, but instead refers the complainant to the "remedy" of filing a private lawsuit.
See 24 C.F.R. ch. 1, subch. A, app. I, § 103.400; Implementation of the Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3268 (1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 103.400).
92 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
93 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. Once a case has been elected, the FHAA
requires the Justice Department to file suit on behalf of the aggrieved person in federal court
within 30 days of the election. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o). Virtually all elected cases have resulted
in a lawsuit or a presuit settlement at this stage. On rare occasions, however, Justice has deter-
mined that newly discovered information or other circumstances would make a suit inappropri-
ate, and it has returned these cases to HUD for further consideration. See COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 90, at 185-88, 213-14. As of December 6, 1993, the Justice Department had filed a
total of 293 election cases. See id. at 212. The number of election lawsuits has far exceeded the
number of "pattern or practice" and other DOJ litigation under the FHAA. See, e.g., 1993 HUD
REPORT, supra note 83, at 30 (reporting that DOJ's civil enforcement activity under the FHAA
in 1993 included filing 91 election cases, 20 "pattern or practice" cases, 1 zoning case, and 8
prompt judicial action cases, and that the comparable figures for 1992 were 58, 16, 5, and 4,
respectively).
94 See 1989 HUD REPORT, supra note 81, at 21; 1990 HUD REPORT, supra note 80, at 13;
1991 HUD REPORT, supra note 84, at 12; 1992 HUD REPORT, supra note 85, at 12; 1993 HUD
REPORT, supra note 83, at 26; 1994 HUD REPORT, supra note 87, at 26.
95 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at 211 (reporting that as of October 1993,
HUD had issued charges in 619 cases, of which 369 (60%) were elected). Most elections have
been made by respondents, although complainants have also elected in a number of cases; on
occasion, both parties have filed an election. See id. (reporting that of the 369 cases elected as of
October 1993, elections were made by respondents in 268 of these cases, complainants in 77
cases, and both in 24 cases). The rate of election has not been significantly different for the
various types of discrimination. See id. at 56. The election rate has remained at about 60%
through 1996. Interview with Paul Hancock, Chief, Housing and Civil Enforcement Section,
Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 4, 1996).
96 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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1989 through 1994, HUD referred approximately 22,000 fair housing com-
plaints to state and local agencies, a figure that represented about forty per-
cent of HUD's overall complaint load.97
During this six-year period, a sufficient number of states and localities
adopted fair housing laws that were substantially equivalent to the FHAA so
that by 1994, almost half of the HUD complaint load was referred to agencies
in those jurisdictions. 98 By 1996, California (the largest HUD-complaint
state) had been added to the substantially equivalent list, which included
some thirty states and forty-four localities that now handle well over half of
all FHAA complaints filed with HUD.99
Assuming that this complaint load yields anywhere near the same degree
of cause determinations as occurs in HUD-retained cases,'0 the result will
likely be that hundreds of FHAA charges will now be filed every year by
state and local agencies. Accordingly, lawyers working for these agencies,
along with the lawyers who prosecute the cases that are "elected" to court
out of these agencies, will regularly have to face the same sorts of profes-
sional issues that HUD and DOJ lawyers face under the FHAA.
One other noteworthy development occurred during the early years of
the FHAA: both HUD and DOJ lawyers adopted the practice of sending a
form letter to the aggrieved persons on whose behalf they were acting in
97 The yearly figures were as follows: 3222 referrals to state and local agencies out of a
total HUD complaint load of 7174 in 1989; 3218 referrals out of a total of 7675 in 1990; 3663
referrals out of a total of 9320 in 1991; 3109 out of a total of 9461 in 1992; 4053 referrals out of a
total of 10,184 in 1993; and 4786 out of a total of 9670 in 1994. See supra notes 82-87. Adding
these yearly figures together produces a combined six-year total of 22,051 referrals out of a total
HUD complaint load of 53,484 for a referral rate of 41.2%. It should be noted that the addition
of these yearly figures does not produce a precisely accurate set of total six-year figures because
this process involves adding together figures for years that were sometimes reported on a calen-
dar year basis and sometimes on a fiscal year basis. See supra note 83. Nevertheless, the general
order of magnitude of the six-year totals and the basic points made here-that thousands of
referrals occurred during this period and that these referrals made up a major portion of HUD's
complaint load-are not significantly affected by this change in HUD's data reporting system.
98 See 1994 HUD REPORT, supra note 87, at 16 (reporting that state and local agencies
received 4786 (49.5%) of the total of 9670 HUD complaints in 1994). None of these states or
localities had laws equivalent to the FHAA when it first became effective, but a significant
number of referrals were still made at that time based on an FHAA provision authorizing up to
a 48-month "grace period" during which previously certified states and localities were allowed to
continue to receive referrals. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(0(4); ScHWEMM, supra note 2, § 24.5(3).
Indeed, during this 48-month period, about 40% of the HUD complaint load was referred to
these previously certified state and local agencies. See figures cited for the years 1989, 1990,
1991, and 1992 supra notes 82-85. By the time the 48-month grace period expired in 1992, a
sufficient number of states and localities had enacted laws substantially equivalent to the FHAA
that referrals accounted for over 30% of the HUD complaint load in 1992 and almost 40% in
1993. See figures cited for the years 1992 and 1993 supra notes 85, 86.
99 See SCHWEMM, supra note 2, § 24.5(2). For a list of these states and localities, see id. at
app. C.
100 Some evidence exists that a somewhat smaller percentage of cases result in cause deter-
minations by state and local agencies than for HUD-processed complaints. In 1994, for example,
HUD found cause in 21% of all cases in which a cause or no cause determination was made,
whereas this rate for state and local referral agencies was 15%. See 1994 HUD REPORT, supra
note 87, at 17. Even with this lower rate, however, these agencies found cause in 161 of the
referred cases in 1994. See id.
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order to clarify the nature of the professional relationship early on. The
HUD letter, sent soon after a charge is filed, explains the administrative pro-
cess, states that HUD will "represent" the complainant in this process, notes
the possibility that the complainant's interests may ultimately diverge from
the government's, and points out the right of the complainant to hire his or
her own attorney and to intervene in the case.101
The Justice Department form letter is sent to the aggrieved person soon
after an election occurs and before suit is filed. This letter explains that the
United States will bring suit on behalf of this person without cost; notes that
''we are available to assist you and act on your behalf" at all stages of the
case and that "we will consult carefully with you" in determining the appro-
priate amount of monetary relief to seek; and points out that, although the
interests of the complainant and the United States are expected to be the
same, "the possibility does exist that at some point our respective interests
may differ" and that the complainant has the right to retain his or her own
attorney and to intervene in the case.10 2
Eventually, the Justice Department lawyers responsible for FHAA elec-
tion cases became so concerned with their proper relationship to aggrieved
persons in these cases that they asked for a formal opinion on this matter
from the DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC"). This opinion, issued in
January 1995, concluded that "the Department attorney does not enter into
an attorney-client relationship with the complainant" in an election case,10
3
but that "in view of the potential confusion on behalf of complainants regard-
ing the nature of the relationship, it would seem prudent to advise them that
the government attorney is not their attorney."'104 The OLC's opinion con-
cluded that the form letters currently being sent to aggrieved persons by Jus-
tice and HUD were sufficient to achieve this purpose, because they made
clear "that the possibility exists that the government's interests may diverge
from the complainant's, and that the complainant is entitled to retain his or
her own attorney."'10 5
To summarize, the FHAA has generated a considerable quantity of
cases in which government lawyers at HUD, the Justice Department, and
state and local agencies have been called upon to act on behalf of private
complainants. In this respect, the FHAA has accomplished one of Con-
101 A copy of this letter [hereinafter HUD Letter] is on file with the authors. See also supra
note 91; infra note 105 (discussing the meaning of the word "represent" in this letter).
102 A copy of this letter [hereinafter DOJ Letter] is on file with the authors.
103 Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Memorandum from Assistant Attorney
General Walter Dellinger to Assistant Attorney General Deval L. Patrick regarding "The Rela-
tionship Between Department Attorneys and Persons on Whose Behalf the United States Initi-
ates Cases Under the Fair Housing Act" 2 [hereinafter DOJ Opinion] (Jan. 20, 1995) (copy on
file with the authors). This opinion also concluded that DOJ attorneys do not have any fiduciary
duties or other litigation-related obligations to complainants in election cases. See id. at 5-6. The
opinion did note, however, that communications between DOJ lawyers and complainants could
be protected from disclosure under the "common interest/joint defense" privilege. See id. at 6-7.
104 Id. at 6.
105 Id. The OLC opinion did note, however, that the use of the word "represent" in HUD's
letter, see supra text accompanying note 101, "may create confusion by overstating the nature of
the relationship." DOJ Opinion, supra note 103, at 6.
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gress's principal goals in amending Title VIII's enforcement scheme. The
system created by the FHAA, however, also created the potential for some
major problems for these government lawyers, including divided loyalties
and other ethical issues, which have become quite real in a number of FHAA
cases. The next section will demonstrate the substance of these problems
that, in some cases, have led to a less than satisfactory form of representation
for the aggrieved persons on whose behalf the legislation was enacted.
Il "Triangular" Professional Relationships and the FHAA
As noted above, when Congress assigned to HUD and DOJ lawyers the
task of bringing actions on behalf of private complainants, it created triangu-
lar professional relationships in FHAA cases. 106 Such relationships are not
unusual in either the private or governmental practice of law,1' 7 but they are
always professionally problematic. In fact, the various bodies of legal ethics
rules devote considerable effort to the problems created by such relation-
ships.108 Triangular professional relationships spawn issues of loyalty, zeal,
and control over litigation for the lawyers engaged in them, and the situations
created for HUD and DOJ lawyers under the FHAA proved to be no
different.
A. Some Illustrative Cases
Actual experience under the FHAA has shown that the professional
problems are quite real. Four HUD-charged cases under the FHAA provide
a sample of the professional issues facing government lawyers litigating on
behalf of private parties who allege housing discrimination.
1. United States v. Presidio Investments, Ltd.
In United States v. Presidio Investments, Ltd.,109 a tenant ified a Title
VIII complaint with HUD alleging sexual harassment by the manager of her
apartment complex. 110 The alleged harassment occurred in 1987, before the
FHAA was passed.11' By the time HUD completed its investigation, how-
ever, the FHAA was in effect, and HUD processed the case under that law's
106 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
107 See infra Part III.A.
108 For example, Model Rule 1.7(a) and DR 5-105 regulate the triangular situation
presented by a lawyer simultaneously representing two clients with adverse interests. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE PoNsmmrrY DR 5-105 (1980); MODEL RuLES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CoNzucr Rule 1.7(a) (1996). Similarly, Model Rule 1.8(g) and DR 5-106 control settle-
ments on behalf of multiple clients in the same setting. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONsIBILITY DR 5-105; MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.8(g). Model
Rule 1.8(f) and DR 5-107(A) pertain to the triangular scenario of a lawyer being paid by one
other than the client. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsP oNsiBILrry DR 5-107(A);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.8(f). Model Rule 1.13(d) expressly governs
the troublesome triangular relationship of a lawyer representing an organizational client while
dealing with the various third-party constituents of the organization, such as directors, officers,
and shareholders. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUct Rule 1.13(d).
109 4 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1993).
110 See id. at 806.
111 See id. at 807.
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new administrative procedures.1 2 HUD determined that reasonable cause
existed to believe that illegal sex discrimination occurred, and it issued a
charge against the apartment complex and its manager.
113
The manager elected to have the case tried in federal court, and the
Justice Department filed suit on behalf of the complainant.114 Believing that
the FHAA should not be applied retroactively, however, the district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the
case.115
It was at this point that problems arose between the private complainant
and her government lawyers. The complainant wanted to challenge the dis-
trict court's adverse ruling on the retroactive application of the FHAA, but
the Justice Department was hesitant. By pro se motion, the complainant
sought to intervene at the district court level, but her motion was denied.116
The Justice Department then filed a notice of appeal on the complainant's
behalf, but subsequently "reversed its field and sought to withdraw its notice
of appeal, 11 7 prompting the complainant to file another pro se intervention
motion with the district court and, two days later, with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Ninth Circuit"). 1 8 The Ninth Cir-
cuit eventually granted the complainant's motion to intervene, substituted
her for the United States in the appeal, and held that the district court incor-
rectly denied retroactive application of the FHAA. 19
The Justice Department may have had legitimate reasons, as counsel for
the United States, to support the positions it took in Presidio.120 One cannot
read the case, however, without sensing that the complainant was abandoned
by her government lawyers and that she was not served with the loyalty and
the zeal that she likely expected to receive from lawyers who brought an
action on her behalf.
112 That is, HUD decided that the FHAA's new procedures should be applied retroactively
to Title VIII cases that were pending when the FHAA took effect. See id. at 809 (citing 24
C.F.R. ch. 1, subch. A, app. I, subpt. A, § 103.1 (1990); Implementation of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3259 (1989)).
113 See id. at 807.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 806.
116 See id. at 807.
117 Jd.
118 See id.
119 See id at 808, 810; see also United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management
Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1994) (permitting the plaintiff to intervene and substitute for the
United States on appeal and citing Presidio).
120 At the time, there was an "apparent tension" based on "seemingly contradictory state-
ments" in the Supreme Court's recent opinions dealing with the retroactive application of newly
amended statutes. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1496 (1994). This tension was
not resolved until 1994, when the Court in Landgraf adopted a general presumption against
retroactivity and applied this presumption to deny retroactive application of certain remedial
amendments to the federal employment discrimination law. See id at 1508. This ruling, in retro-
spect, makes the DOJ's position in Presidio seem more than justified.
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2. Baumgardner v. HUD
A similar scenario arose in another FHAA appeal, Baumgardner v.
HUD.121 In this case, a male complainant named Holley alleged that Baum-
gardner had a house for rent that he denied to Holley and his male friends
because of their gender.122 HUD found reasonable cause and issued a
charge. 23 When neither party filed an election, HUD lawyers represented
Holley in the subsequent administrative proceeding. This proceeding
culminated in a HUD ALU decision that awarded the complainant a total of
$5000 in actual damages, of which $2500 was for loss of civil rights,124 and
that also assessed a $4000 civil penalty and injunctive relief against
Baumgardner. 25
Baumgardner filed an appeal, and the Justice Department undertook to
"defend" the ALl's decision in the court of appeals, arguing that it should be
upheld in all particulars except one.126 The exception was the $2500 "civil
rights" element of Holley's damage award, which Justice felt could not be
justified because of an adverse Supreme Court precedent on such damages in
another civil rights field.127 The point was an arguable one,128 and Holley was
forced to obtain his own lawyer to defend the ALl's decision.129
Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
("Sixth Circuit") agreed with the Justice Department and set aside the ALl's
award for loss of civil fights. 30 It is possible, however, that this award might
have received more sympathetic treatment from the court of appeals if the
Justice Department had vigorously defended Holley's position. Further-
more, even though HUD lawyers prosecuted the case before the AL, and
then different DOJ lawyers handled the appeal, Baumgardner again raises
121 960 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992).
122 See id. at 574-75.
123 See id. at 575.
124 See id, at 575, 581. These actual damages also included $2000 for inconvenience and
other economic losses and $500 for emotional distress. See id. at 580-81.
125 See id. at 575.
126 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at 181-83. Pursuant to Part VI, para. 2 of the
"Memorandum of Understanding between DOJ and HUD Concerning Enforcement of the Fair
Housing Act, as Amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988" entered into on De-
cember 7, 1990, the Justice Department is responsible for all appellate court litigation arising
from HUD proceedings. See id. at 180-81. A copy of this Memorandum is on file with the
authors.
127 See Baumgardner, 960 F.2d at 581-82 (discussing Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v.
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986)); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at 182 (same). Justice
argued, unsuccessfully, that the $2500 award should be upheld as "compensation for actual in-
jury, not [for] the abstract value of civil rights." Baumgardner, 960 F.2d at 581.
128 See Baumgardner, 960 F.2d at 585-87 (Jones, J., concurring); COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 90, at 182-83; ScHWEMM, supra note 2, § 25.3(2)(b).
129 See Baumgardner, 960 F.2d at 574.
130 See id. at 583. The Sixth Circuit also reduced the award for economic losses and incon-
venience from $2000 to $1000, upheld the $500 emotional distress award, reduced the civil pen-
alty from $4000 to $1500, and adjusted the injunctive relief. See id. at 580-81, 583-84. Although
it was critical of HUD's precharge handling of the case, the Sixth Circuit felt that the HUD
mistakes were not so prejudicial to Baumgardner to require reversal of the ALJ's decision on
liability, which the court of appeals upheld. See id at 575-79.
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questions about the overall duty of loyalty of government lawyers to FHAA
complainants.
3. Soules v. HUD
Perhaps the most dramatic example of government lawyers switching
sides in an FHAA case is Soules v. HUD,'31 which was a nonelected case in
which the complainants were initially represented by HUD attorneys. The
complainants alleged that a rental agent named Downs refused to rent an
apartment on familial status grounds. 132 The principal complainant was a wo-
man named Sherry Soules, who sought to rent the unit for herself, her
mother, and her minor daughter 33 At their initial meeting, Downs asked
Soules how old her daughter was and noted that she could not rent the unit
to noisy tenants because an elderly person lived downstairs. 134 There was
other evidence suggesting familial status discrimination, but the AJ ruled in
favor of Downs, concluding that her treatment of and statements to Soules
and other prospects with children could be explained by nondiscriminatory
reasons. 135
At this point, Soules wanted to appeal, but her HUD lawyers felt they
could not challenge an FHAA administrative decision beyond the confines of
the Department. 136 Soules, therefore, obtained her own attorney, who prose-
cuted an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
("Second Circuit").137 In this appeal, the adverse ALJ decision was defended
not only by Downs's attorney, but by the Justice Department as well.138
Thus, within the same FHAA matter, Sherry Soules was represented by gov-
ernment lawyers from HUD, abandoned by those same lawyers, and directly
opposed in her appeal by other government lawyers from the DOJ.
The Second Circuit upheld the ALI's decision against Soules, but a fair
reading of its opinion indicates that the court had difficulty resolving the le-
gality of the oral statements made by Downs.139 The court of appeals noted
that a rental agent's oral statements and questions are more difficult to evalu-
ate than written statements and advertisements, 140 and questions about famil-
ial status might be allowed although questions about other prohibited types
131 967 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1992).
132 See id. at 821.
133 See id. at 819.
134 See id. at 820.
135 See HUD v. Downs, Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 25,011, at 25,176-80 (Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev. Sept. 20,1991), affd sub nom. Soules v. HUD, 967 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1992).
136 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at 180. "As HUD's lawyer, OGC may not
appeal to Federal court any adverse administrative decisions that become the final order of the
agency." Id. (footnote omitted).
137 Compare Downs, Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 25,011 (indicating HUD attorneys
on behalf of Soules), with Soules, 967 F.2d at 819 (indicating separate private counsel for Soules).
138 See Soules, 967 F.2d at 819; supra note 126 (regarding DOJ's responsibility for repre-
senting HUD in appellate cases arising from HUD proceedings).
139 See Soules, 967 F.2d at 824-26.
140 See id. at 824-25 (contrasting the review accorded written advertisements, which can be
viewed by the court, with oral statements taken out of context, which preclude review).
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of discrimination would not.141 Indeed, the opinion actually quoted the Jus-
tice Department's brief on this latter point, noting that "whereas '[t]here is
simply no legitimate reason for considering an applicant's race .. . there are
situations in which it is legitimate to inquire about the number of individuals
interested in occupying an apartment and their ages.""' 142 Thus, Soules ulti-
mately lost her appeal and must have had serious doubts about the "repre-
sentation" she received from government lawyers.143
4. United States v. Country Club Garden Owners Ass'n
A fourth illustrative case, United States v. Country Club Garden Owners
Ass'n,1" provides additional evidence that when conflicts arise, Justice De-
partment lawyers view their real client in FHAA election cases as the gov-
ernment and not the complainant. The complainant in Country Club Garden
was a handicapped woman named Josephine Palasciano who suffered from
osteoarthritis and other conditions that severely restricted her ability to
walk.145 Shortly after the FHAA became effective, she and her husband re-
quested that the owners of the cooperative building where they lived assign
them a parking space near their unit.146 They also asked the owners to per-
mit them to add a gate and steps to the terrace behind their unit to allow Mrs.
Palasciano immediate access to the parking space.147
When the owners denied these requests, Mrs. Palasciano filed a HUD
complaint in late 1989, which eventually led to a determination of reasonable
cause and a charge some three years later.148 The defendants then filed an
election, and the Justice Department brought suit in October 1992, alleging
that the defendants' refusal to grant the Palascianos' requests violated the
"reasonable modifications" and "reasonable accommodations" provisions of
141 See id. at 824 (noting that questions regarding children are permissible if concerned, for
example, with whether the neighborhood is suited for children; however, questions regarding
race are never permitted).
142 Id. at 824.
143 It is interesting to speculate about what the case's posture might have been if Soules had
won her appeal. Presumably, the court of appeals would have remanded the case back to the
ALJ for further proceedings, either to take a new look at the liability issue or, if the appellate
court had decided liability, to determine the appropriate relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(k)(1)(B)
(1994) (authorizing appeals court to "affirm, modify, or set aside, in whole or in part, the order,
or remand the order for further proceedings"); see also Kelly v. HUD, 3 F.3d 951, 957-58 (6th
Cir. 1993) (remanding for conciliation or further ALJ proceedings). At this stage, one intriguing
set of questions would arise as to whether the same HUD lawyers who had abandoned Soules
and left her opposed by the Justice Department's appellate lawyers would now be expected to
take up her case again. If so, with what degree of enthusiasm would they or she have ap-
proached this new relationship? On the other hand, if HUD lawyers refused to represent her,
would a complainant like Soules effectively be "penalized" for prosecuting a successful appeal by
having to participate in the second ALJ proceeding without the help of government attorneys?
144 159 F.R.D. 400 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
145 See id. at 401.
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 See id.
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the FHAA. 149 The DOJ complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief
and compensatory and punitive damages but did not demand a jury trial. 50
In mid-1993, the Palascianos decided to try to intervene in this case be-
cause of their concern that the Justice Department was not sufficiently ag-
gressive in pursuing their claim for damages. 151 They hired a private lawyer
who waited until January 1994 to file a motion to intervene and then failed to
comply with the local rules regarding service of this motion, which led to its
denial. 152 The Palascianos then retained a new lawyer, who properly filed the
motion and attached a copy of their complaint, which was in all material re-
spects identical to the Justice Department's complaint except that it de-
manded a jury trial.
153
The defendants objected to the intervention motion on the ground that
it occurred some two years after the filing of the initial complaint and there-
fore was not "timely" as required by Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.154 In a 1995 opinion, the district court granted the Palascianos'
motion, noting that they had an unconditional right to intervene under the
FHAA155 and that the defendants failed to show that they would be
prejudiced by the delay in the Palascianos' intervention. 5 6 The court also
concluded that the Palascianos would be prejudiced if they were prohibited
from participating as parties "because they would be precluded from effec-
tively putting the issue of liability and punitive damages before a jury."'1 57
The court based this latter conclusion on its belief that the Palascianos
and the United States were pursuing "divergent interests" in this case. 58 In-
deed, the Justice Department's principal trial attorney supported this view by
filing an affidavit stating that "the government did not demand a jury trial in
this case because it is interested in obtaining a favorable ruling on issues of
first impression that are raised in the complaint, and that such a ruling is
149 Id. at 402. The FHAA's "reasonable modifications" and "reasonable accommodations"
provisions, respectively, make it unlawful (1) to refuse to permit, "at the expense of the handi-
capped person, reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied ... by such person, if
such modifications may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises" and
(2) to refuse "to make reasonable accommodations to rules, policies, practices, or services, when
such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to
use and enjoy a dwelling." See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A), (B) (1994).
150 See Country Club Garden, 159 F.R.D. at 402.
151 See id. at 403-04. Although the Palascianos claimed that they retained a private lawyer
to help them intervene "upon being apprised of their right to intervene," there was in fact a gap
of some eight months between the Justice Department's filing of a complaint on their behalf
(and presumably informing them of their right to intervene, see supra note 102 and accompany-
ing text) and the Palascianos' retention of private counsel. See Country Club Garden, 159 F.R.D.
at 403. The reason for this delay was not explained in the case.
152 See Country Club Garden, 159 F.R.D. at 402.
153 See id.
154 See id. at 403. Rule 24(a), which governs interventions of right in the federal district
courts, provides in pertinent part: "Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to inter-
vene in an action ... when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to
intervene." FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a).
155 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
156 See Country Club Garden, 159 F.R.D. at 402, 404.
157 Id. at 404.
158 See id. at 403-04.
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more likely to come from a district judge rather than a jury."'159 In contrast,
the Palascianos argued that presentation of their case to a jury was important
to them, especially in terms of obtaining an award of punitive damages. 160
Given the Justice Department's admission that its interests were not the same
as those of the Palascianos, the district court concluded that the Palascianos
had "a significant interest in being present during the trial of this case";161 it
granted their motion to intervene and went on to uphold their jury trial de-
mand as well.' 62
The Country Club Garden case presents a less dramatic example of "di-
vergent interests" between the complainant and the government than oc-
curred in Presidio, Baumgardner, and Soules, but it nevertheless reinforces
the notion that HUD and DOJ lawyers see their client as the government,
and that these lawyers may pursue a different set of priorities in the litigation
than the complainant would want. Indeed, the ultimate resolution of this
case showed that these potentially divergent interest were in fact quite real.
Just a few months after the court allowed the Palascianos to intervene, the
parties reached a settlement agreement. The defendants agreed not only to
assign the Palascianos a special parking space and to provide for construction
of steps from the Palascianos' unit to this space, but also to pay an additional
$90,000 to Josephine Palasciano, an amount that currently stands as one of
the largest financial settlement ever obtained in an FHAA election case. 63 It
seems highly unlikely that such monetary relief would have been obtained for
the Palascianos if they relied exclusively on DOJ attorneys to represent
them.
5. Summary of Cases
These four cases illustrate some of the complications that may confront
government lawyers, their agencies, and the private claimants on whose be-
half they litigate in HUD-charged cases under the FHAA. The cases demon-
strate that the interests of the government and the private parties might
diverge in FHAA litigation in a number of different ways, resulting in ethical
issues for the government lawyers as to loyalty, zeal, and control over the
litigation. The Country Club Garden case shows that the complainant's inter-
est in maximizing the monetary portion of an award or settlement might con-
flict with the government's preference for creating favorable precedents or
for structural injunctive relief aimed at insuring nondiscrimination in the fu-
ture. The Presidio and Baumgardner cases demonstrate that the government
may have views on certain important legal issues that differ from those
favorable to the aggrieved person.!64 Presidio and Soules show that the gov-
159 Id. at 403.
160 See id.
161 Id. at 404.
162 See id. at 404, 406.
163 See Recent Settlement, 11 [Bulletin 1] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.)
1.14 (Jan. 1, 1996) (reporting United States v. Country Club Garden Owners Ass'n, No. 92-
CV-5146 (ADS) (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 1995)).
164 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at 186-87, 195-96 (discussing, respectively,
DOJ's refusal to bring FHAA cases against other federal agencies and its history of occasional
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ernment may be more hesitant than a complainant to appeal an adverse
decision.
165
Other conflicts may arise as well. For example, the government gener-
ally disfavors confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements, while ag-
grieved persons may prefer not to see a favorable monetary settlement lost
over such an issue.166 The government may also find itself acting on behalf of
a complainant whose monetary demands it finds excessive' 67 or who is unap-
pealing in some other respect.
168
All of these complications arise from the triangular relationship that
Congress created when it assigned government lawyers the task of bringing
actions on behalf of private complainants under the FHAA. Such triangular
relationships always create some uncertainty as to the identity of the client
and the consideration to be given to the interests of the other party. In
resolving these complications, it would be natural for HUD and DOJ lawyers
to look for guidance from Congress as to how it intended the relationships to
be structured.
B. Lack of Congressional Guidance
Congress has provided precious little guidance on how government law-
yers in HUD-charged FHAA cases should behave within the triangular rela-
unwillingness to rely on the disparate impact theory of discrimination in housing discrimination
cases).
165 See also United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413,
1415-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the complainant, pro se, requested an extension to file an
appeal after the government did not appeal on her behalf).
166 Interview with Paul Hancock, Chief, Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, Civil
Rights Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 15, 1995). In the analogous area
of precharge conciliations, the FHAA provides that conciliation agreements "shall be made pub-
lic unless the complainant and respondent otherwise agree and the Secretary [of HUD] deter-
mines that disclosure is not required to further the purposes of this subchapter." 42 U.S.C.
§ 3610(b)(4) (1994). HUD regulations provide that a conciliation agreement executed by the
complainant and the respondent is subject to approval by HUD and that HUD will approve such
an agreement only if it will "adequately vindicate the public interest." 24 C.F.R. § 103.310(b)(1)
(1996). HUD's concern for vindicating the public interest in conciliation agreements, which
commonly takes the form of seeking affirmative action and reporting requirements from the
respondent in addition to whatever monetary relief is obtained for the complainant, also surfaces
in settlement negotiations conducted by HUD and DOJ lawyers in charged cases.
167 See, e.g., Reply Brief for the United States Re Duty of Representation Under the Fair
Housing Act at 8, United States v. Kingswood Village Property Owners Ass'n, Civil No. S-94-
0927 DFLIJFM (E.D. Cal. June 6, 1996) (stating that, among other things, complainant's non-
negotiable demand for $25,000 in monetary relief "made it increasingly difficult for the United
States to reach a fair and equitable settlement").
168 See, e.g., United States v. Weiss, 847 F. Supp. 819, 821,824 (D. Nev. 1994) (election case
in which the Justice Department sought leave to file an amended "pattern or practice" complaint
after depositions of the complainants revealed perjury, substance abuse, and a criminal record,
making them "unsuitab[le] both as tenants and as plaintiffs"); see also United States v. Woodlake
Realty Co., Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 9 16,044 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 3, 1996)
(order denying complainants' request for extension of time and additional discovery in election
case where Justice Department had agreed to equitable consent decree with defendants without
resolving complainants' claims for monetary damages after complainants accused the DOJ attor-
neys who were prosecuting the case of "racial bias, moral turpitude, judicial corruption, personal
dishonesty, conflict of interest and violation of an individual's constitutional rights").
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tionship that includes their agencies and the persons aggrieved on whose
behalf they are directed to act. The statute's "on behalf of" language and its
goal of helping private complainants enforce the FHAA by providing gov-
ernment lawyers to prosecute their claims give only minor and uncertain
clues about what the government attorneys should do when a complainant's
interests diverge from those of the government. In addition, the FHAA's
legislative history is virtually devoid of any discussion of these matters, sug-
gesting that Congress never even considered, much less tried to resolve, the
difficulties of the triangular relationship created by the FHAA.
This lack of congressional guidance may stem from the fact that the pre-
cise nature of the FHAA's scheme for using HUD and DOJ lawyers to act on
behalf of private complainants was established late in the legislative process
with little attention paid to its rationale. The original bills that were the sub-
ject of House and Senate hearings (H.R. 1158 and S. 558) and the amended
version of the House bill that was reported by the House Judiciary Commit-
tee on June 17, 1988, provided for neither the election-to-court option nor
any role for the Justice Department in the administrative process. 69 Rather,
the administrative cases were to be handled entirely within HUD and prose-
cuted only by HUD lawyers.
The election-to-court option resulted from an amendment offered early
in the House floor debates by Congressman Fish, the ranking Republican
member of the Judiciary Committee.170 The purpose of this amendment was
to relieve the concerns of some House members that the Seventh Amend-
ment right to jury trial would be compromised by a procedure that allowed
AIs to award damages for fair housing violations.171 The election-to-court
option provided a way of allowing a party who desired a jury trial to have the
case resolved in a federal court where a jury would be available.
Congressman Fish's proposal, which was ultimately adopted by a 401-0
vote on June 23, 1988, generated little substantive discussion, apart from the
members' apparent relief at finding a mechanism that appeared to eliminate
the Seventh Amendment issue. 72 Adoption of the Fish amendment was the
key compromise that led to overwhelming bipartisan support for H.R. 1158
in the House, which passed the amended bill three days later by a vote of
376-23.173
Both the original bills and the House-passed version provided that HUD
lawyers would prosecute all cases that began with a HUD complaint, regard-
less of whether the case remained within HUD or was elected to court. In
the month or so before the Senate floor debates began on August 1, however,
certain "modest modifications" to the House-passed bill were agreed to by
Senators Kennedy, Specter, and Hatch. 74 One of these modifications pro-
169 See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 16-17 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2177-
78.
170 See 134 CONG. REc. 15,848 (1988).
171 See id. (remarks of Rep. Fish); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 70-75, reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2206-12 (additional views of nine Judiciary Committee members).
172 See 134 CONG. REa 15,851 (1988).
173 See id. at 16,511.
174 See id. at 19,711.
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vided that the Justice Department, rather than HUD, would handle all court
litigation resulting from administrative complaints (i.e., prompt judicial ac-
tions and elected cases). 75
A memorandum explaining these changes in the House-passed bill was
sent to the full Senate by Senators Kennedy and Specter on August 1,
1988.176 This memorandum, which provides the only legislative rationale for
giving the responsibility for prompt judicial actions and elected cases to Jus-
tice, simply described this change as "consolidat[ing] in the Justice Depart-
ment the authority to represent the federal government in each of the
enforcement actions contemplated under the Act.' 77 Thus, the sole articu-
lated reason for moving FHAA cases from HUD to Justice was to ensure
that a single agency, the Justice Department, would handle all government
court litigation-"pattern or practice" cases and cases arising from the ad-
ministrative process.
This Senate "substitute" was endorsed by the Reagan Administration,
with HUD Secretary Pierce describing the new role of the DOJ in adminis-
trative cases as "centraliz[ing] fair housing litigation at the Department of
Justice."'178 The Senate passed this version of the bill by a vote of 94-3 on
August 2, after a few hours of floor debate and two more minor amend-
ments.' 79 On August 8, after a brief floor discussion, the House concurred in
the Senate version, 180 and on September 13, 1988, President Reagan signed
this bill into law.
181
Thus, the legislative history reveals that both the election-to-court op-
tion and the shifting to Justice of the responsibility for all court cases arising
out of the administrative process resulted from last-minute changes in the
legislation. These changes were not accompanied by any guidance from Con-
gress about the nature of the legal representation that the government would
provide for private aggrieved parties;182 nor did Congress provide insight into
175 See id. at 19,712.
176 See id. at 19,712-13.
177 Id. at 19,712.
178 See id. at 19,714.
179 See id. at 19,902.
180 See id. at 20,920. During this brief floor discussion, Congressman Edwards, the chief
sponsor of the bill in the House, did express some concern over the Senate's decision to have the
Justice Department, rather than HUD, prosecute court cases arising from the administrative
process. He noted that:
Transferring litigation authority to the Justice Department may create distinctions
in Federal agency responsibilities between HUD and the Justice Department in fair
housing cases. . . .This divide[d] responsibility for handling these often routine
cases... may defeat consistency and hamper the development of an effective body
of expertise within HUD.... [T]he possibility exists that individual cases of hous-
ing discrimination may not receive the focus needed [at Justice] to address the na-
tional problem of housing discrimination.
Id. at 20,916.
181 See id. at 23,711.
182 As if to compound the confusion of the FHAA's original legislative history, Congress in
1995 and 1996 very nearly enacted legislation that would have transferred the entire administra-
tive apparatus of the FHAA from HUD to Justice, again without providing any explanation for
the rationale for this major change in the government's fair housing enforcement program. See
infra notes 284-289 and accompanying text.
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the representation that HUD lawyers would provide to aggrieved persons in
administrative proceedings within HUD. In the absence of such guidance,
the resolution of the professional issues presented by the triangular relation-
ship created by the FHAA was left to the parties involved.
C. Practical Realities and Government Lawyers
Lacking any congressional guidance on the nature of their triangular re-
lationship in HUD-charged cases under the FHAA, government lawyers in
each of the four illustrative cases discussed above pursued their agencies'
position rather than that of the private complainant when a conflict arose.183
This fact sheds considerable light on the views of agencies and government
lawyers as to the resolution of the professional issues presented by the
FHAA representations. The lawyers perceive the interests of the private
complainant as subordinate to the interests of their governmental agency.
Considering certain realities regarding these triangular professional scena-
rios, this result is not surprising.
Government lawyers are employed by and regularly represent their gov-
ernmental client,184 and they are experienced in and accustomed to asserting
its interests. Private complainants, on the other hand, present professional
relationships and interests for government lawyers that are more transitory.
Given the ongoing nature of the professional relationship between the law-
yers and the government, it would be difficult to expect them to owe their
primary allegiance to the private parties, 185 at least in the absence of precise
direction by Congress to do so. 1
86
Furthermore, on certain legal issues, government lawyers must advocate
a consistent, specified legal policy adopted by their agency. This is especially
true in the area of civil rights, in which law and policy are closely intertwined.
For example, consider the position taken by the Justice Department on the
retroactivity of the FHAA's enforcement provisions in Presidio.187 Given the
Justice Department's position on this issue, it would have been remarkable if
the DOJ attorneys had taken a contrary position merely because the govern-
ment brought the matter on behalf of a private party under the FHAA.188
183 See supra Part II.A.
184 For further discussion of the identity of the government client, see infra note 196.
185 The Comment to ABA Model Rule 1.7, governing conflicts of interests generally, pro-
vides that among the relevant factors to be considered in ascertaining the potential for adverse
effect on a representation is "the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the
client or clients involved." See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.7 cmt. 11
(1996). This Comment implies that a long-standing, continuing relationship with one client
would elevate the likelihood of adverse effect on the simultaneous representation of another
client with conflicting interests.
186 For an example of a situation in which Congress has given such direction, see 10 U.S.C.
§ 827(a)(2) (1994) (providing that lawyers serving as military defense counsel shall not also serve
in an investigatory or adjudicatory role).
187 See supra Part II.A.1.
188 Advocating inconsistent legal positions on a given issue would likely undermine the
government's credibility. In contrast, a lawyer in private practice might more easily maintain a
legal position on behalf of a client in one matter while urging a contrary position on behalf of
another client in a separate matter. Even for lawyers in private practice, however, simultane-
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Additionally, FHAA cases, although substantial in total number, consti-
tute only a fraction of the caseload of Justice Department lawyers. It is un-
likely that these government lawyers would assume an entirely novel
relationship with their employer and usual client within the narrow context of
the FHAA representation of a private complainant. Such an approach would
be remarkable in the absence of specific direction from Congress.
This natural tendency of government lawyers to favor the interests of
their usual governmental client over those of private complainants under the
FHAA is now reflected in the official policy of the DOJ. A 1995 opinion
from the DOJ's OLC declares that no lawyer-client relationship exists be-
tween government lawyers and aggrieved persons in FHAA litigation and
even concludes that these lawyers owe no fiduciary duties to the private com-
plainants in these cases. 189 This position certainly makes the resolution of the
professional issues considerably easier for the government lawyers involved.
Whether it accurately reflects Congress's vision of entrusting government
lawyers with private enforcement of the fair housing law, however, is a much
harder question.
Is this the only way to view the relationship between the government
lawyers and private complainants seeking enforcement of the FHAA? Is it
possible, even given these practical realities, to accommodate both of these
competing interests? The answer may lie in analogous situations involving
triangular professional relationships.
III. Solving the Problems of the FHAA's Triangular Relationships
Triangular professional relationships are not unusual in the practice of
law. In representing a client, lawyers often must deal with professional pres-
sures created by the presence of other clients or nonclient third parties in a
representation. Rules of ethics provide standards by which lawyers must
judge the propriety of potentially conflicting representations and to which
lawyers must look for guidance on structuring these relationships. 190
ously taking conflicting legal positions on behalf of different clients can rise to the level of an
ethical problem.
The Comment to ABA Model Rule 1.7 provides a test for resolving the ethical question:
whether the positional conflict adversely affects the representation of the clients. See MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. 9 (1996). The Comment explains that "it is
ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, but it
may be improper to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate court." Id. That
approach seems to focus on the precedential effect of the outcome in one matter on the other.
Professor Wolfram suggests a broader test for the appropriateness of taking positional con-
flicts. His approach turns "on the degree of probability that the issue would arise in each litiga-
tion and, if it would, the importance of the issue in each litigation and the likely impact of a
decision upon the interests of the other client in the pending and undecided case." CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETMICS § 7.3, at 355 (1986).
189 See DOJ Opinion, supra note 103, at 2, 5.
190 For example, the Model Rules address problems of simultaneous representation of two
adverse interests, see MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1996), conflicts cre-
ated by the lawyer's own personal or financial interests, see id. Rules 1.7(b), 1.8(a),(c)-(e), pres-
sures resulting from fee payments made by nonclient third parties, see id. Rule 1.8(0, and
complications inherent in family relationships between opposing counsel, see id. Rule 1.8(i). The
prior ABA treatment of legal ethics, the Model Code, dealt with similar issues. See, e.g., MODEL
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Lawyers facing these triangular situations generally confront two issues.
First, the lawyer must determine which of the other two entities will be
viewed as a "client," to whom the lawyer will owe the most exacting of ethi-
cal duties.191 Second, in order to decide whether to proceed with the repre-
sentation, the lawyer must make an assessment of the effect that the interests
of the other entity will have on the legal representation of the client.
192
These determinations are critical to the lawyer's compliance with the various
ethical rules governing conflicts of interest.
The enactment of the FHAA left the government lawyers who bring ac-
tions on behalf of private complainants unsure of how to resolve these issues
and of how to proceed in the face of the conflicting interests presented by the
triangular relationships that the legislation created.193 Because Congress
gave no hint as to how to answer these two prerequisite questions, the law-
yers from HUD and Justice have been left to wonder about their professional
responsibilities. 194
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101 (1980) (lawyer's personal interests); id. DR
5-104 (lawyer's business relations with clients); id. DR 5-105 (representing multiple clients); id.
DR 5-107 (interests of third parties).
Despite the presently dominant position of the Model Rules among the states, DOJ lawyers
are expected to comply with the earlier Model Code, the ABA's prior codification of ethical
rules. This obligation is provided by a federal regulation promulgated prior to the ABA's 1983
adoption of the Model Rules. See 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-1(b) (1996) ("[A]ttorneys employed by the
Department [of Justice] should be guided in their conduct by the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility of the American Bar Association."). Given the predominant position of the Model Rules
nationally, however, in discussing the application of ethical rules to the governmental represen-
tation of private complainants under the FHAA, this Article discusses the Model Rules in addi-
tion to the Model Code. It might be noted that even the Justice Department takes guidance
from both the Model Rules and the Model Code despite the federal regulation's reference to the
Model Code. See, e.g., DO Opinion, supra note 103, at 4 (referring to Model Rules 1.2 and 1.7
and DR 5-105(A) as sources of guidance for DOJ attorneys); 28 C.F.R. § 77.1 (referring to
Model Rule 4.2's rules regarding communications with parties represented by counsel as a
source of guidance for DOJ attorneys); id. § 77.12 (similarly referring to Model Rule 4.2 and DR
7-104(A)(1)).
191 It is to the "client" that the lawyer owes the duties, for example, of competence under
Model Rule 1.1 and the Model Code's DR 6-101, diligence under Model Rule 1.3 and the Model
Code's DR 6-101, confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6 and the Model Code's DR 4-101, and
loyalty under Model Rule 1.7 and the Model Code's DR 5-105. See MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILTY DR 6-101, 4-101, 5-105 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.6, 1.7 (1996).
192 For example, under Model Rule 1.7(b), the lawyer must determine whether the interests
of other clients, third parties, or the lawyer will materially limit the representation of a client.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.7(b) (1996). Similarly, under the Model
Code's DR 5-105(A), a lawyer must "decline proffered employment if the exercise of his in-
dependent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected
by the acceptance of the proffered employment." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BiLIY DR 5-105(A) (1980).
193 For further discussion of the lack of congressional guidance offered when the FHAA
was enacted, see supra Part II.B.
194 Se4 e.g., supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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A. Models of Triangular Professional Relationships
To resolve the problems faced by government lawyers who bring actions
on behalf of private complainants under the FHAA, an examination of other
triangular professional relationships offers helpful insights. Although these
relationships generally arise in private legal representations, some of the
models resemble other situations in which government lawyers have been
assigned the task of representing private interests.
1. The Two-Client Model
One way to view the professional relationship created by Congress
under the FHAA is simply as an instance of simultaneous representation of
two clients.195 That is, the lawyers in these proceedings could be viewed as
representing both their usual governmental client' 96 and the private com-
plainant as well.
195 Conceivably there could be even more than two clients, because a HUD or DOJ lawyer
may well be required to pursue the claims of more than one private complainant in the same
FHAA case. For example, in the Soules case, two private complainants-Sherry Soules and a
fair housing organization named Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. of Buffalo-had indi-
vidual claims and interests that were quite distinct from one another. See HUD v. Downs, Fair
Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 25,011, at 25,171-72 (Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. Sept. 20,
1991), affd sub nom. Soules v. HUD, 967 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1992).
196 Even in traditional government practice, the precise identity of a government lawyer's
"client" may be a difficult issue. Professor Wolfram notes that conflict of interest problems for
government lawyers are particularly troublesome "because of the frequent absence of any single
client who can unequivocally direct the lawyer on the substantive position to be taken in a mat-
ter and, if necessary, discuss and possibly consent to conflicts in representations." WOLFRAM,
supra note 188, § 8.9.1, at 448. He goes on to list several possible solutions:
Various candidates [as the government lawyer's "client"] are offered, such as the
"government;" the lawyer's "agency;" the "head" of the agency; the lawyer's "im-
mediate superior," whoever has the power to hire and fire; or the "people." An-
other, related approach is to abandon the "who is the client" inquiry and to posit
that the role of the government lawyer is to serve "good government in and of
itself," the "public interest," "justice," or a similar abstraction that is not tied to a
particular entity.
Id. § 13.9.2, at 756-57 (footnotes omitted). An excellent discussion of the complexity of the
client identity issue is provided by Robert P. Lawry, Confidences and the Government Lawyer,
57 N.C. L. Rsv. 625, 631-38 (1979).
The ethical rules are not very helpful in resolving a government attorney's client identity
problem. For example, the Comment to Model Rule 1.13 entitled "Organization as Client" ad-
dresses the issue by noting:
Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it is generally
the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the
head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the gov-
ernment as a whole may be the client for purposes of this Rule.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.13 cmt. 6 (1996) (emphasis added). The
earlier Model Code is even less helpful. In Ethical Consideration 5-18, the drafters note that:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his alle-
giance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, represen-
tative, or other person connected with the entity. In advising the entity, a lawyer
should keep paramount its interests and his professional judgment should not be
influenced by the personal desires of any person or organization.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1980). Although certainly the gov-
ernment lawyer represents an "entity" as a client, the Model Code offers no guidance on the
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Simultaneous representation of multiple clients occurs frequently in the
private practice of law.197 For example, criminal defense lawyers sometimes
represent two or more defendants in the same trial.198 On occasion, personal
injury lawyers represent multiple plaintiffs injured in the same event. 99 Sim-
ilarly, a domestic relations lawyer will at times be approached by a married
couple seeking joint representation in the amicable dissolution of their
marriage.
200
When the interests of these multiple clients are consistent, the joint rep-
resentation may offer the clients the dual advantages of presenting a consis-
tent, unified front in the matter and a reduction in the total cost of legal
services.201 Such representations, therefore, are often attractive to clients.2°
2
The ethical rules provide standards for judging the propriety of simulta-
neous multiple representations. Under the American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), such a representation
is generally prohibited if one client's interests are "directly adverse"203 to
another client's, or if the representation of one client would be "materially
limited"204 by the lawyer's representation of the other client. In either situa-
tion, the Model Rules contemplate that a lawyer will proceed with the repre-
sentation only if the lawyer reasonably believes that the representation of
one client will not adversely affect the relationship with the other and if both
characterization of the proper entity or on the individuals who may speak for that entity. Profes-
sor Lawry has noted that the Model Code's vagueness on the identity of the client was the prod-
uct of the drafters' assumption that clients are readily identifiable individuals. See Lawry, supra,
at 632.
In FHAA enforcement cases, HUD and DOJ lawyers might offer different answers to the
client identity question. The HUD lawyer might generally look to the agency as client, while the
DOJ lawyer might have a broader view. For example, some commentators have asserted that
within the Justice Department, the Solicitor General is "the lawyer for a special client, the
United States." Jeffrey A. Burt & Irving S. Schloss, Note, Government Litigation in the Supreme
Court: The Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 YALE L.J. 1442, 1443 (1969).
Although the client identity issue is troubling, for purposes of this Article no definitive
resolution is necessary. It is sufficient to note that HUD and DOJ lawyers regularly represent
their governmental clients, however described. Thus, if those lawyers are also representing pri-
vate complainants as "clients" in FHAA cases, they are engaged in a multiple client representa-
tion. When the interests of the multiple clients diverge, the government lawyers must resolve
the conflict of interest in some way.
197 Although lawyers represent multiple clients in transactional matters such as business
deals and estate planning, the examples cited here all involve litigation because that is the pro-
cess involved in FHAA enforcement efforts.
198 Such multiple representations present a number of potential conflicts of interest. See
WOLFRAM, supra note 188, § 8.2.2, at 412. They create problems under the law of legal ethics
and under constitutional doctrine pertaining to effective representation of counsel. See id.
§ 8.2.1.
199 See id. § 7.3.3 (describing the potential for conflicts of interest between coplaintiffs).
200 This practice was facilitated by the wide-scale enactment of no-fault divorce statutes,
obviating the need for allegations and proof of marital misconduct. See Laws. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:308-09 (1995).
201 WOLFRAM, supra note 188, § 7.3.1, at 349.
202 Professor Wolfram sees the permissibility of such joint representations as essentially
furthering client autonomy. See id.
203 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.7(a) (1996).
204 ld. Rule 1.7(b).
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clients consent after full disclosure. 2 5 Additionally, settlements offered dur-
ing such representations cannot be accepted without the consent of all the
clients.
206
Even if appropriate when initiated, multiple representations can become
inappropriate if the clients' interests later diverge.207 In these instances, the
lawyer must refrain from representing either client without the consent of the
other.208 In most situations, this means that each client will seek new, sepa-
rate counsel.
The multiple-client scenario provides an appealing analogue for the gov-
ernment lawyer's role in the triangular relationship created by the FHAA. In
most instances, the interests of the private complainant will align with those
of the government client. This apparent confluence of interests undoubtedly
explains why Congress turned to HUD and DOJ lawyers to bring actions on
behalf of persons aggrieved by housing discrimination. In these typical cases,
the government lawyer would have no difficulty providing equally loyal, zeal-
ous, and effective representation to the governmental and private clients.
As applied to the FHAA situation, however, the model has some flaws.
The risk of conflicts developing in these cases still exists, as demonstrated by
the illustrative cases discussed above.29 Most important, the lawyer's preex-
205 See id. Rule 1.7. By comparison, the ABA's earlier Model Code generally prohibits
simultaneous representation of more than one client when their interests are likely to be differ-
ing, but permits such a representation if the lawyer has the informed consent of the clients and
"it is obvious that [the lawyer] can adequately represent the interest of each" client. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A)-(C) (1980).
206 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSInILrrY DR 5-106(A) (1980); MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.8(g) (1996).
207 See MODEL RuLFs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7 cmt. 2 (1996) ("If such a con-
flict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the repre-
sentation."). The Model Code provides that lawyers not only "shall decline proffered
employment," MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) (1980), but also
that they "shall not continue multiple employment," id. DR 5-105(B), when conflicts are
apparent.
208 Under the Model Rules, this requirement is explicit. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7 cmt. 2 (1996) ("Where more than one client is involved and the
lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation, whether the lawyer may con-
tinue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9."); id. Rule 1.9(a) ("A lawyer who
has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the
same ... matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless the former client consents after consultation."). If a lawyer attempts to
continue the representation of one client in the same matter after the representation of multiple
clients becomes inappropriate, the lawyer needs the consent of the former clients whom he or
she is no longer representing. See icL Rule 1.9(a).
The ABA's earlier Model Code had no express rule governing subsequent representations
by lawyers against former clients. See WOLFRAM, supra note 188, § 7.4.2, at 363-64. Because
such representations usually implicate confidential information provided to the lawyer by the
former client, however, the rules governing confidential client communications generally require
client consent. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B), (C) (1980).
Thus, when a multiple representation is terminated under the Model Code, the lawyer cannot
continue to represent one of the clients without the consent of the other terminated client. 'For
further discussion of the relationship between subsequent representations and problems of confi-
dentiality, see WoLFRAM, supra note 188, § 7.4.2, at 359-61.
209 See supra Part II.A.
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isting, naturally dominant relationship with the government client makes it
quite unlikely that unbiased joint representation can continue if conflicts do
eventuate. Furthermore, a government lawyer facing such a conflict will be
incapable of withdrawing from the representation of both clients, as contem-
plated by the Model Rules. 210 In the event of conflicts, therefore, the lawyer
continues to represent the governmental client without the consent of the
private complainant who must obtain legal counsel elsewhere.21' This scena-
rio may lead to feelings of betrayal on the part of the private complainant
212
and to legitimate concerns about whether the representation provided by the
government lawyers was the representation contemplated by Congress in en-
acting the FHIAA.
2 13
The multiple-client model has several shortcomings in its application to
FHAA cases. Although it seems apposite to the typical FHAA situation, its
initial appeal obscures the difficulties it presents when conflicts arise. In fact,
government lawyers may actually have this model in mind when they ap-
proach these cases and then complain of difficult professional issues in
FHAA representations. Other models may offer more comfort both to the
government lawyers and the private complainants.
210 See supra note 208 and accompanying text. One writer has argued to the contrary,
maintaining that the Justice Department should be expected to withdraw from any "cases in
which a shift in political power compels the government to switch sides in a lawsuit." Clifford
Freed, Comment, Ethical Considerations for the Justice Department when It Switches Sides Dur-
ing Litigation, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 405,406 (1984) (discussing Washington v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982), a case involving a mandatory busing program intended to re-
duce racial imbalance in public schools). For a view expressing similar concerns based on misuse
of confidential information by government lawyers when the government switches sides, see
Note, Professional Ethics in Government Side-Switching, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1914 (1983) (discuss-
ing Washington).
211 This arrangement violates the standards suggested by the Model Code and the Model
Rules. See supra note 208.
212 In addition to the loyalty concerns of the private complainant in such a situation, there
are additional concerns about confidentiality. It is possible and even likely that the complainant
has provided the government lawyer with information relating to the representation during the
time that the lawyer provided legal services jointly to that individual and the government. When
the lawyer withdraws from the representation of the complainant but continues the representa-
tion of the government in the matter now in a manner adverse to the complainant, concerns
about the misuse of that information may be quite real. For an argument that government law-
yers possessing such information should be disqualified from such matters, see Note, supra note
210.
213 One commentator has argued that the practice of side-switching by the Justice Depart-
ment undermines public confidence in the law. The argument proceeds:
The "images and appearances" of Watergate are visions of a few government
figures infusing politics into the justice system.
That is precisely the same image that is conveyed to the public when the gov-
ernment switches sides in the middle of a lawsuit, deserting its coparty and zeal-
ously advocating in one court exactly the opposite of what it advocated in another.
The image perceived by the public is that of a "hired gun"-the lawyer working at
the whim of a political administration, advocating without conviction whatever is
the prevailing sentiment of the prevailing administration. Whether confidences are
in fact betrayed, the appearance of betrayal breeds public distrust of the legal pro-
fession and of government ethics in particular.
Freed, supra note 210, at 421-22 (footnotes omitted).
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2. The One Client, Third-Party Payor Model
Another model of a triangular professional relationship that may offer
guidance occurs when a lawyer represents a client while a third party pays the
lawyer's fee.214 In private practice, this relationship arises, for example, when
a lawyer represents one family member while another family member pays,
or when a lawyer provides legal services to clients under a group legal plan.
The model is common in the governmental arena as well. Publicly funded
civil legal aid is an example. A public defender representing an indigent
criminal defendant is another.2
1 5
The ethics rules clarify the propriety of such relationships. They are per-
missible only if the client consents to the arrangement and the lawyer ignores
any efforts by the third-party payor to direct or interfere with the lawyer's
exercise of professional judgment on behalf of the client 16 The rules thus
contemplate that the lawyer will provide loyal and zealous representation to
the client while disregarding the third-party payor's influence and interests.
Any conflicts between the client and the third party must be resolved in favor
of the client.217 Indeed, if interference from the third party becomes too stri-
dent and impairs representation of the client, the lawyer may have to end the
representation.218
Although the model works well in describing the governmental lawyer
serving as public defender or legal aid advocate for indigent clients, it does
not fit the FHAA scenario. Certainly the HUD and DOJ lawyers are em-
ployed and paid by their governmental agencies. Unlike the public defenders
or publicly funded legal aid lawyers, however, HUD and DOJ lawyers are
not employed in settings specifically structured to provide legal assistance to
private parties. In fact, these lawyers regularly represent the government it-
self in related matters. Given the interest of the government agencies in the
214 See WOLFRAM, supra note 188, § 8.8.2.
215 Professor Wolfram explores the peculiar tensions created by a system that funds both
the prosecution and defense of those accused of crimes. See id. at 445-46.
216 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry DR 5-107(A), (B) (1980) (permit-
ting a third party payor relationship only when the lawyer does not permit the payor to "direct
or regulate" his or her professional judgment in rendering legal services to the client); see also
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUct Rule 1.8(f) (1996) (permitting such a relationship
only when the client consents, there is no interference with the independence of professional
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship, and information relating to the representation is
kept confidential); id. Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from allowing "a person who ... pays the
lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judg-
ment in rendering such legal services").
217 Professor Wolfram puts the matter succinctly: "[t]n normal cases a lawyer who repre-
sents a client with a third person paying the fee must devote his or her entire loyalty to the
pursuit of the client's interests. Pursuing the interests of the fee-paying party adverse to the
interests of the client is plainly impermissible." WOLFRAM, supra note 188, § 8.8.2, at 444-45
(footnote omitted).
218 The representation under these circumstances would violate the rules discussed supra in
note 216. Under both the Model Rules and the earlier Model Code, if the representation cannot
be continued without the violation of an ethical rule, it must be terminated. See MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry DR 2-110(B)(2) (1980); MODEL RuTEs OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUcT Rule 1.16(a)(1) (1996).
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cases litigated, the lawyers cannot easily treat those agencies as merely third-
party payors for the lawyers' services.
With a clear expression of congressional intent, however, it would seem
that this approach could work in the FHAA context. Congress could have
chosen to provide free legal representation to private parties alleging housing
discrimination with a funding mechanism for paying for these legal services.
These services, however, would undoubtedly have to be rendered by nongov-
ernmental lawyers. The government, therefore, could act as a third-party
payor for the lawyers' representation of the private clients.
Instead, Congress directed HUD and DOJ lawyers to litigate on the be-
half of those parties. 219 In the absence of specific congressional guidance and
in the light of practical reality,2 0 those lawyers cannot be expected to view
the private complainants as their clients to the exclusion of their usual gov-
ernmental client. The above cases illustrate that when conflicts arise, govern-
ment lawyers side with their usual governmental client. Under the
circumstances, the single client, third-party payor approach is not a realistic
model for viewing the FHAA's triangular relationships.
3. The One Client, Third-Party Beneficiary Model
The one client, third-party beneficiary model of triangular professional
relationships arises when the lawyer's representation of a client foreseeably
benefits a nonclient third party. The increasing frequency of legal malprac-
tice suits by such third parties demonstrates that such relationships are com-
mon.2 1 Estate planning is a good example.2 2 Lawyers drafting wills and
trusts for clients must consider the interests of third persons intended to be
the beneficiaries of their work.
Ethical rules also speak to this form of triangular representation. Those
rules contemplate that the lawyer will provide loyal and zealous representa-
tion for the client and will further the interests of the third party looking to
benefit from the lawyer's services only to the extent that the client's interests
permit.2 3 Thus, when conflicts arise, the client's interests must predominate
over those of the third party.22 4
219 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
220 See supra Part II.B-C.
221 See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 301:601-02 (1995).
222 See WoLFRAM, supra note 188, § 5.6.4, at 224-26 (discussing the shift away from the
requirement of privity in legal malpractice actions, especially in the area of estate planning).
223 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmrLrrY DR 5-107 (1980) (prohibiting law-
yers from giving in to any interest that might affect his or her independent professional judg-
ment); id. EC 5-21 (providing that "[t]he obligation of a lawyer to exercise professional
judgment solely on behalf of his client requires that he disregard the desires of others that might
impair his free judgment"); see also MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7(b)
(1996) (prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation may be materially
limited by a lawyer's responsibilities to a third person unless the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents after consultation).
224 This is one reason why identifying the "client" is so important. See supra note 191 and
accompanying text.
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The single client, third-party beneficiary model has some relevance to
the FHAA situation.225 It most closely fits "pattern or practice" cases in
which government lawyers bring discrimination suits of public importance on
behalf of the government, but in which they also may seek remedies for pri-
vate aggrieved persons as well.2 26 In these cases, the lawyers may represent
their traditional governmental clients loyally and zealously while knowingly
benefiting nonclient private third parties at the same time.
Certainly we could employ this model to evaluate HUD-charged cases
brought on behalf of private complainants, even though those cases are not
based upon allegations of a pattern or practice of discrimination. Under this
model, HUD and DOJ lawyers can simply represent their governmental cli-
ents with the knowledge that the private complainants will benefit from the
representation as well. The illustrative cases discussed above suggest that
HUD and DOJ lawyers may do just that. They certainly view the private
complainants as something less than "clients" when any conflicts arise, choos-
ing to subordinate the complainants' interests to those of their traditional
governmental clients. In this way, this model seems consistent with the natu-
ral and practical tendencies of these governmental lawyers.
The application of the model to the HUD-charged case, however, is
more troublesome than when it is applied to pattern or practice cases. Even
if the model seems to approximate the manner in which the government law-
yers currently approach FHAA cases on behalf of private complainants, it
appears to fall short of the likely expectations of those seeking legal assist-
ance to enforce their fair housing rights. Also, the question remains whether
this is the form of representation that Congress intended when it assigned
these cases to government lawyers. Congress may have envisioned some-
thing more closely approaching "legal representation" when it directed HUD
and DOJ lawyers to bring actions "on behalf of' private complainants. If so,
this model offers those parties too little actual representation.
4. The Shifting Model
A final model of triangular professional relationships that could be used
to analyze the government lawyer's role in representing private complainants
under the FHAA might be called the "shifting model." Under this approach,
the representation begins according to the multiple client approach discussed
above.2 27 Normally, the lawyer can continue the representation to conclusion
in this form. If conflicts develop between the clients under this approach,
however, rather than terminating the representation of both clients,228 the
225 Courts generally have the most difficulty finding lawyer liability to nonclient third par-
ties in the case of litigation. See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 301:601-02 (1995).
The model of the single client and third-party beneficiary, however, provides instruction for
assessing the relationship between the government lawyer and the private complainant in
FHAA cases.
226 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
228 Such withdrawal would be required as to both clients under the two-client model dis-
cussed above. See supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
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lawyer shifts the representation to another model that provides full represen-
tation to one client but something less to the other.
This scenario arises in the private practice of law when a lawyer repre-
sents the insured and insurer in an insurance defense matter. Although the
ethical rules do not expressly endorse the "shifting model" 229 and it is some-
what controversial even within the field of insurance law,230 a number of
courts have utilized this model in insurance cases23' and some scholars have
229 The term "shifting model" is used by the authors to describe one response to the trian-
gular relationship in the insurance defense context. The Model Rules mention this recurring
ethical problem only in the comments, where the drafters recognize that "when an insurer and
its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement, and
the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure
the special counsel's professional independence." MODEL RuLs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr
Rule 1.7 cmt. 10 (1996). Similarly, the Model Code refers to the situation only in its Ethical
Considerations, rather than its Disciplinary Rules, and merely identifies the scenario of lawyers
representing both the insurer and the insured as a "[t]ypically recurring situation[ ] involving
potentially differing interests." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmiLrr EC 5-17
(1980). For these situations, the Model Code offers only the following guidance:
Whether a lawyer can fairly and adequately protect the interests of multiple clients
in these and similar situations depends upon an analysis of each case. In certain
circumstances, there may exist little chance of the judgment of the lawyer being
adversely affected by the slight possibility that the interests will become actually
differing; in other circumstances, the chance of adverse effect upon his judgment is
not unlikely.
Id. In Professor Wolfram's view, "[n]either set of rules gives more than general guidance,
although it is reasonably clear from both that the insurance lawyer's allegiance, if slanted in
either direction, must be aligned with the insured." WOLmFAM, supra note 188, § 8.4.1, at 429
(footnote omitted).
230 See generally Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or
the Insured?, 72 Tax. L. REv. 1583 (1994) (exploring the controversy of whom the lawyer repre-
sents in the insurance defense context). The dispute as to the proper way to view the lawyer's
relationship with the insurer and the insured is usually couched in terms of the "one client"
approach versus the "two client" approach. A helpful discussion of the two approaches is found
in WiLLiAM H. FORTUNE ET AL., MODERN LITGATION AND PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsMIrr'
HANDBOOK § 15.3, at 502-06 (1996). Professor Silver advocates the two client model in which
the lawyer represents both the insured and the insurer. See Silver, supra, at 1606. The strongest
advocate for the "one client" approach has been Professor John K. Morris. See John K. Morris,
Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under Liability Insurance Policies: A Proposed Solution, 1981
UTAH L. REV. 457. The one client model has also been adopted by the new Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers, which states:
A lawyer might be designated by an insurer to represent the insured under a liabil-
ity insurance policy in which the insurer undertakes to indemnify the insured and to
provide a defense. The lawyer represents the insured. The insurer is not, simply by
the fact that it designates the lawyer, a client of the lawyer.
RE TATEMENT (THIRD) OF TmE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215 cmt. f (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996) (emphasis added).
231 While not using the "shifting model" label, several courts have approached the triangu-
lar relationship presented by insurance defense matters in a similar fashion. That is, they see the
lawyer representing both the insurer and insured as clients at the outset, but when conflicts arise
they see the lawyer as having the option of continuing the representation of one of the clients,
thus changing the relationship with the other. In Parsons v. Continental National American
Group, 550 P.2d 94 (Ariz. 1976) (in banc), for example, a lawyer hired by the insurer to repre-
sent an insured learned facts that suggested a lack of coverage. See id. at 96. The court con-
cluded that the lawyer should have notified the insurer that it no longer represented it, while
continuing to represent the insured as a client. See id. at 98. In the usual multiple representa-
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endorsed it as well. 23 2 The model contemplates that the insured and the in-
surer will normally share a common interest in minimizing liability to the
tion, the lawyer would be expected to withdraw from the representation of both clients. See
supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text. Special treatment of the insurance defense context
was also recognized in American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr.
561 (Ct. App. 1974), where the court noted that the relationship begins as a joint representation
of two clients, id. at 571, but can change:
The tranquility of this coalition is disturbed however, where, as here, disagreement
arises between the members. Dissatisfaction flowering into litigation may disrupt
the harmony of the arrangement. The attorney who formerly represented two cli-
ents in a special and unique relationship now must choose among alternative
courses of action. He may totally withdraw from the entire relationship. He may
continue to represent the insured as to third parties on pending matters, continuing
at the same time to represent the insurer. Other avenues may be open to the attor-
ney ....
Id at 572. Similarly, in Lieberman v. Employers Insurance, 419 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1980), the court
saw the lawyer as representing both the insured and the insurer at the outset of the relationship.
See id. at 424. When a dispute arose as to the settlement of the matter, however, the court
declared that the lawyer should have withdrawn from the representation entirely (the course of
action generally contemplated when multiple representation becomes inappropriate) or should
have withdrawn from representing either the insured or the insurer. See id. at 425.
232 While the term "shifting model" has not been used by other writers, some utilize an
approach that is similar. For example, our colleague Professor Richard H. Underwood has ar-
gued that the insurance defense lawyer represents both the insured and the insurer as clients.
See Richard H. Underwood, The Doctor and His Lawyer: Conflicts of Interest, 30 KAN. L. REV.
385, 387-88 (1982). If the lawyer gains confidential information from the insured regarding a
possible lack of policy coverage, however, Professor Underwood argues that the lawyer should
continue to represent the insured but not disclose the information to the insurer. See id. at 399.
This approach appears to convert the initial multiple representation of both the insured and the
insurer as clients into a different arrangement, with the lawyer representing only the insured as a
client.
Professor Underwood was later joined in this approach by his coauthors Professors William
H. Fortune (another of our colleagues) and Edward J. Imwinkelried in their book, Modern Liti-
gation and Professional Responsibility Handbook. In applying the two-client model to the prob-
lem of the insurance defense lawyer's acquisition of confidential information pertaining to
coverage defenses, they argue that the lawyer cannot continue to represent the insurer as client
and that the representation of the insured can continue only if she is recognized as the sole
client, an apparent shifting of the relationship. See FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 230, § 15.7.1, at
518-24.
In making his strong case for the one-client model, Professor Morris also endorses an ap-
proach akin to the authors' "shifting model" at least as it applies to confidential information.
While maintaining that the insurance defense counsel represents only the insured as a client, he
recognizes that the lawyer may ordinarily freely share information pertaining to the representa-
tion with the insurer. See Morris, supra note 230, at 478-79. This sharing of information would
permit the lawyer to inform and advise the insurer on matters of potential liability exposure,
settlement, and so on, even if the lawyer does not represent the insurer as a client. When the
lawyer acquires information that suggests a lack of coverage, however, Professor Morris main-
tains that the lawyer should not disclose the information to the insurer because the insured is the
sole client. See id. at 482-83. Although the approach taken by Professor Morris does not recog-
nize the initial arrangement to be the joint representation of both the insured and the insurer, it
does contemplate that the lawyer's relationship with the insurer to be something less than what it
was at the beginning.
That the insurance defense lawyer's relationship with the insured and insurer is a hybrid one
that can change from a joint representation to one favoring the insured is reflected in the com-
mon assertion that the insured is the primary client. The notion that one client in a joint repre-
sentation should be favored is inconsistent with the usual notion of ethical multiple
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plaintiff3 3 Joint representation typically furthers these common interests. 23 4
The lawyer in this situation can look upon both the insured and the insurer as
clients and serve both loyally and zealously.
At times, however, the interests of the insured and insurer conflict. This
occurs, for example, when the lawyer learns facts that may indicate that there
is no coverage under the policy or that liability in excess of the policy cover-
age makes settlement more attractive to the insured than the insurer3 5
When this happens, the representation of both parties equally as clients can-
not continue. 23 6 Under the usual approach in the two-client model, the law-
yer must withdraw from the representation of both clients.23 7 In the
insurance scenario, however, the insured has paid for the right to a defense
against claims. Abandonment by the lawyer may conflict with this contrac-
tual expectation. As a result, one resolution has been to recognize a shift to a
representation somewhat akin to the one client, third-party beneficiary
model. The lawyer continues to represent the insured, and the insurer may
benefit from that representation.238 Ufider this shifting model, the original
lawyer must now subordinate the interests of the insurer, as a nonclient third
party, to those of the insured, who remains a client.23 9 To the extent that the
insurer feels that its own interests warrant representation, however, it is ex-
pected to obtain its own legal counsel.240
This shifting model has some appeal as an analogue for FHAA cases.
The HUD or DOJ lawyer who represents a private complainant can ordina-
representations. See Silver, supra note 230, at 1587-88. Professor Wolfram notes that the hybrid
relationship favors the insured. See WOLFRAM, supra note 188, § 8.4.1, at 428.
233 See Silver, supra note 230, at 1608-09.
234 See id.
235 For a concise discussion of potential conflicts of interest between the insured and in-
surer, see WoLFRAM, supra note 188, § 8.4.
236 Under the Model Rules, because the interests of the clients would be directly adverse,
the representation of each client would be adversely affected by the relationship with the other.
See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7 (1996). Using the Model Code ap-
proach, the lawyer would be representing clients with differing interests, and it would not be
"obvious" that the lawyer could adequately represent the interests of each client. See MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILTY DR 5-105 (B), (C) (1980).
237 See supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
238 In the insurance context, by providing loyal and zealous representation to the insured,
the lawyer presumably also serves the common interest of the insurer in avoiding or minimizing
liability. One author, however, has suggested an opposite application of this approach. See John
W. Dondanville, Defense Counsel Beware: The Perils of Conflicts of Interest, 18 FORUM 62
(1982). Mr. Dondanville argues that when conflicts arise, the lawyer should withdraw from the
representation of the insured while continuing in some form the representation of the insurer.
See id. at 68. Mr. Dondanville does recognize, however, that the attorney-client privilege may
"prevent[ ] the attorney from revealing anything he was told during the course of the relation-
ship." Id.
239 Professor Wolfram describes the remaining relationship between the lawyer, the in-
sured, and insurer as something of a hybrid. "The accommodation that the law in most jurisdic-
tions seems to require involves compromises with the extreme models suggested by a single-
valued pursuit of either of the opposing impulses, although with a decided tilt in favor of the
insured." WOLFRAM, supra note 188, § 8.4.1, at 428.
240 This is the result contemplated by the court's approach in Parsons v. Continental Na-
tional American Group, 550 P.2d 94, 98-99 (Ariz. 1976) (in banc). See supra note 231. It is also
the result favored by Professor Underwood and Professor Morris. See supra note 232.
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rily treat both that party and the government as clients because their interests
usually are consistent. If a conflict develops, however, the lawyer cannot
continue the two-client model of representation. 241 Given the preexisting
employment arrangement with the government agency, the lawyer could not
be expected to abandon the government client in favor of the private com-
plainant.242 Thus, the representation logically and practically must evolve
into one in which the lawyer represents the government as the sole client. To
the extent that the complainant's interests are served by this new form of
representation, that person becomes a beneficiary of the lawyer's services on
behalf of the government. The complainant also may secure separate legal
counsel if necessary to advocate interests distinct from those of the
government.
This shifting model offers the most promise as an approach to the profes-
sional problems that may arise in FHAA cases. It utilizes the multiple repre-
sentation approach for the usual situation in which the interests of the
government and the private complainant nicely coalesce. It also recognizes
that the interests of the complainant and the government may diverge and
accommodates the practical realities of the government lawyer when these
conflicts arise. The model may also most closely accomplish the likely intent
of Congress in assigning these cases to HUD and DOJ lawyers. Even so,
structuring such a triangular relationship requires some care, especially if the
relationship will at least minimally satisfy the expectations of the private
party recipients of the government's legal representation.
B. Structuring the Relationship
Under the rules of legal ethics, a lawyer must approach any professional
relationship presenting potential conflicts of interest with caution.2 43 Even
when the rules allow a potentially conflicting relationship, the lawyer may
enter and continue the relationship only with the client's fully informed con-
sent.244 The "shifting model" of triangular relationships, which arguably pro-
241 See supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
242 It is inconceivable that this could be accomplished without the lawyer terminating his or
her employment relationship with the government, which is too extraordinary to suggest.
243 The ABA urged this caution in the Model Code, where lawyers were warned as follows:
If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue representation of multiple cli-
ents having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility
that his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues
the employment. He should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the
representation.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrr EC 5-15 (1980). In the ABA's Model Rules,
this caution is embodied in the advice to lawyers to "adopt reasonable procedures... to deter-
mine whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest" in the matters they handle.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7 cmt. 1 (1996).
244 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBILrrY DR 5-105(A), (B), (C) (1980)
(client consent is similarly required when a lawyer is involved in a representation that will "be
likely to involve him in representing differing interests"); id. DR 5-107(A)(1) (prohibiting a law-
yer from accepting payment for legal services from a source other than the client without that
client's consent); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CorCNucr Rule 1.7(a)(2), (b)(2)
(1996) (stating that a lawyer cannot represent a client with interests directly adverse to another
client or when the representation would be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
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vides the most promise as an analogue for FHAA cases, demands particular
care.
As described above, the model starts with the lawyer representing two
clients in the same matter.245 In any simultaneous representation of multiple
clients, the lawyer must understand that the interests of the clients may di-
verge as the matter progresses. 246 Because this potential is not always appar-
ent to the clients, the lawyer must carefully describe the situation to them so
that they may give meaningful consent to the arrangement.247
Given the nature of the shifting model, clients must also understand
from the beginning that the lawyer will continue to represent only one of the
clients if conflicts later arise.248 This notice ameliorates the loyalty and confi-
dentiality concerns regarding the abandoned client, who otherwise might in-
sist that the lawyer refrain from representing the other client as well. Of
course, in some circumstances, these early disclosures may make the joint
another client, a third party, or the lawyer's personal interests, without the informed consent of
the client); id. Rule 1.8(f)(1) (a lawyer cannot accept compensation from one other than the
client without such consent).
245 See supra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
246 The representation of multiple clients in litigation is generally viewed as the most likely
situation for conflicts to materialize. The drafters of the Model Code noted this in discouraging
such joint representations:
A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing inter-
ests; and there are few situations in which he would be justified in representing in
litigation multiple clients with potentially differing interests. If a lawyer accepted
such employment and the interests did become actually differing, he would have to
withdraw from employment with likelihood of resulting hardship on the clients; and
for this reason it is preferable that he refuse the employment initially.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILrrY EC 5-15 (1980). Professor Wolfram also rec-
ognizes the need for a higher state of alert to conflicts of interest in the litigation setting when he
notes that "[c]ourts demonstrate a somewhat more benign attitude as the scene of a conflict of
interest moves away from litigation and into contract and other private-ordering transactions.
Lawyers here, as a general matter, have more latitude to represent clients with arguably differing
interests." WOLFRAM, supra note 188, § 7.3.4, at 356 (footnote omitted).
247 The Model Code's Ethical Considerations emphasize the need for disclosure:
In those instances in which a lawyer is justified in representing two or more clients
having differing interests, it is nevertheless essential that each client be given the
opportunity to evaluate his need for representation free of any potential conflict
and to obtain other counsel if he so desires. Thus before a lawyer may represent
multiple clients, he should explain fully to each client the implications of the com-
mon representation and should accept or continue employment only if the clients
consent. If there are present other circumstances that might cause any of the multi-
ple clients to question the undivided loyalty of the lawyer, he should also advise all
clients of those circumstances.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmIBLIrY EC 5-16 (1980).
248 This factor might cause a potential client to question the undivided loyalty of the law-
yer. The drafters of the Model Code noted the importance of disclosure of any information that
pertains to such doubts:
A lawyer may represent several clients whose interests are not actually or poten-
tially differing. Nevertheless, he should explain any circumstances that might cause
a client to question his undivided loyalty. Regardless of the belief of a lawyer that
he may properly represent multiple clients, he must defer to a client who holds the
contrary belief and withdraw from representation of that client.
Id. EC 5-19.
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representation so unappealing at the outset that the clients may prefer to
have separate counsel throughout the matter.
Government lawyers' representation of private complainants in FHAA
actions can be structured in this way. Given the government's familiarity
with these multiple representations, the disclosure concerns center on the
complainants. In order to obtain informed consent to the representation,
HUD and DOJ lawyers should inform complainants of the precise nature of
the professional relationship resulting from the FHAA enforcement scheme.
This disclosure should advise them of the potential for future conflicts and of
the change in representation that may occur in the event those conflicts
materialize.
HUD and DOJ structure the professional relationships created by
FHAA actions by mailing form letters to the complainants.249 The HUD let-
ter informs the complainant that the agency lawyer will "be responsible for
representing the interests of the government and yourself" in pursuing the
discrimination claim before the agency ALJ.250 It goes on to assure the com-
plainant that HUD lawyers will "represent fully your interests and the gov-
ernment's interests, unless they conflict with each other."251 The letter
advises the complainant of the right to intervene as a party in the proceeding
and points out that the complainant may wish to do so "to enable you to
assert your interests in the event of such a conflict," 25 2 but it also notes that
the complainant is not required to intervene or to secure separate legal
counsel.25 3
The HUD letter sets up a professional relationship with the complainant
that is generally consistent with the shifting model of triangular relationships
discussed above. Although the letter may fail to describe fully the range of
ways in which conflicts might arise in such an arrangement, it does approach
the sort of disclosure that is necessary for the creation of such a relationship.
The Justice Department's letter in FHAA election cases takes a different
approach. When an FHAA case has been elected to court, the DOJ letter
informs the aggrieved person that a lawsuit will be filed "in the name of the
United States on your behalf '25 4 but avoids stating that the Justice Depart-
ment "represents" that person. It notes that "[a]lthough we expect that your
interest and that of the United States will be the same as we proceed to liti-
gate this case, the possibility does exist that at some point our respective
interests may differ, '25 5 and warns that "if you wish to have your own attor-
ney to represent you, you have the right to retain one. ' 25 6 The letter also
advises the complainant of the right to intervene as a party in the matter by a
timely motion.25 7
249 See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
250 HUD Letter, supra note 101, at 1.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 See id. at 2.
254 DOJ Letter, supra note 102, at 1.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 See id.
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Unlike the HUD letter, DOJ's letter takes an approach more akin to the
"one client, third-party beneficiary model" discussed above,258 with its care-
ful avoidance of any claim of "representation" of the complainant. The Jus-
tice approach is supported by an opinion of the department's OLC, 59 which
concludes that DOJ has no lawyer-client relationship with complainants
under the FHAA260 and undertakes no fiduciary duties toward these com-
plainants in fair housing enforcement actions.261 As discussed above, one
might question whether this approach provides the sort of representation to
complainants that Congress intended.2 62 Although it is restrictive in the rep-
resentation it offers complainants, the DOJ approach provides a plausible
resolution of the triangular relationship presented by election cases. Further-
more, the letter used by Justice does a reasonable job of informing complain-
ants of the nature of this relationship.
Regardless of the approach taken to the initiation of the triangular rela-
tionship, additional precautions must be taken if conflicts later develop.
When the government's position diverges from that of an aggrieved person,
the technique used by HUD and DOJ lawyers has been to make clear to the
aggrieved person that they represent only the government and to encourage
that person to hire his or her own lawyer and to intervene in the case.263
Successful intervention by an aggrieved person represented by private coun-
sel frees the government lawyer from any continuing duty to the complainant
and allows that lawyer to focus exclusively on representing the government
without any concern that this "abandonment" of the complainant will jeop-
ardize his or her interests thereafter.
This structuring of the triangular relationship under the FHAA is worka-
ble-that is, it provides sufficient protection for the complainant's interests-
as long as three conditions are met: (1) the complainant must be promptly
and effectively informed of the conflict of interest; (2) he or she must be able
to intervene in the case at this stage; and (3) his or her interests must not
have been prejudiced by the delay in achieving full party status.
The first of these conditions requires that the government lawyer effec-
tively communicate the need for retention of private counsel and interven-
tion to the aggrieved person. This is an on-going duty, not one that can be
satisfied simply by an initial cautionary letter, particularly because the exact
nature of the divergence of interests may not be clear until it actually occurs
well into the case.264 In addition, this communication must be effective-that
is, it must succeed in conveying to the aggrieved person the specific nature of
258 See supra Part III.A.3.
259 For a discussion of this opinion, see supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
260 See DOJ Opinion, supra note 103, at 2.
261 See id. at 5.
262 See supra Part III.A.3.
263 See DOJ Letter, supra note 102, at 1; HUD Letter, supra note 101, at 1.
264 See e.g., United States v. Presidio Investments, Ltd., 4 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1993)
(noting that the complainant moved to intervene after the government attempted to withdraw its
notice of appeal); Baumgardner v. HUD, 960 F.2d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 1992) (government theory of
the case diverging from complainant's at the appellate stage of litigation); Soules v. HUD, 967
F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1992) (complainant filing appeal without government's assistance and eventu-
ally with government opposition).
1997]
The George Washington Law Review
the conflict of interest problem and the steps required for its solution. There-
fore, some method for insuring that the complainant has understood this
message should be included in the communication efforts undertaken by the
government lawyer.
2 65
The second element needed to insure that an aggrieved person's inter-
ests are adequately protected is that the court must allow that person to in-
tervene. At first glance, this condition seems easily satisfied because the
FHAA specifically provides that an aggrieved person "may intervene" in
both ALJ proceedings and elected cases, 266 but in fact this provision does not
guarantee that intervention will always be allowed. Although the statute
gives complainants an unconditional right to intervene,267 an application to
intervene may still be denied if it is not made in a "timely" fashion.
Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern intervention
motions in the federal district courts where election cases are heard, and
HUD's FHAA regulations, which govern intervention motions in ALJ pro-
ceedings, allow for intervention only "[u]pon timely application."'268 The
HUD regulation states that an intervention motion is timely if it is submitted
"within 30 days after the filing of the charge.1 269 The Federal Rules do not
specify what constitutes a timely application, but the case law has identified
certain factors-in addition to chronology-that are relevant to this issue,
which is ultimately left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
270
This timeliness requirement can pose a significant problem in FHAA
cases because the divergence of the government's and the complainant's in-
terests may not occur until the latter stages of a case.271 Indeed, it seems
265 The legislative history of the FHAA shows that Congress viewed complainants as gen-
-erally tending to be people of modest means without a great deal of legal sophistication, see, e.g.,
supra notes 29-30, 36, 39 and accompanying text, which suggests that in order to be effective,
communications directed to complainants by government lawyers must avoid legal jargon and be
easy for a lay person to understand.
266 See supra notes 52, 58 and accompanying text.
267 In elected cases, the statute explicitly provides for "of right" intervention. See supra
note 52 and accompanying text; see also United States v. California Mobile Home Park Manage-
ment Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1994); Presidio, 4 F.3d at 808 n.1; United States v. Country
Club Garden Owners Ass'n, 159 F.R.D. 400, 402-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). The statute does not spe-
cifically authorize intervention in HUD proceedings, but the HUD regulations governing these
cases do provide for such intervention. See infra notes 268-269 and accompanying text.
268 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a); 24 C.F.R. § 104.430 (1996).
269 24 C.F.R. § 104.430.
270 See Country Club Garden, 159 F.R.D. at 403 (citing cases). According to a recent Sec-
ond Circuit decision:
Timeliness defies precise definition, although it certainly is not confined strictly to
chronology. Among the circumstances generally considered are: (1) how long the
applicant had notice of the interest before it made the motion to intervene; (2)
prejudice to existing parties resulting from any delay; (3) prejudice to the applicant
if the motion is denied; and (4) any unusual circumstances militating for or against
a finding of timeliness.
United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. New
York, 820 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1987)).
271 For example, in Soules, Presidio, and Baumgardner, the divergence of interests arose
only after the trial court or ALl had issued a final judgment. See supra note 264. The timeliness
problem can also arise when the divergence of interests occurs at a late pretrial stage. See, eg.,
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inherent in the system that the most likely time for a significant divergence of
interests to occur will not be at the early stages of a case, when the govern-
ment lawyer's principal task is to draft and file the complaint,272 but rather
well along in the proceeding after that lawyer has had occasion to make some
major strategic decisions about how to prosecute the case.
Although virtually all of the intervention motions based on conflicts of
interest in FHAA cases have occurred late in the proceedings, every one of
them has eventually been allowed.273 Indeed, this conflict of interests situa-
tion may present such a compelling claim for intervention that a court or AUL
should never reject it on tardiness grounds, at least if the complainant's mo-
tion occurs reasonably soon after he or she learns of the government's con-
flicting interests.274
This argument could be extended to assert that the FHAA was intended
to override any timeliness requirement for a complainant's intervention in an
ALl or elected case, based on the fact that the statute explicitly requires a
"timely application" for other types of intervention 275 but omits this require-
ment in AUJ and elected cases. 276 Congress certainly has the power to over-
ride the requirements of an otherwise generally applicable procedural rule
when it sets up a remedial system in a civil rights statute.277 Nevertheless, the
Country Club Garden, 159 F.R.D. at 402 (moving to intervene two years after the pleadings were
filed).
272 It is possible for a divergence of interests to occur even at these early stages over such
matters as who should be named as defendants, what relief to seek, and whether to demand a
jury trial in an election case.
273 In at least two of these cases, however, the decision allowing intervention came only as
a result of an appeal from an adverse trial court or ALU decision. See Presidio, 4 F.3d at 807-08;
HUD v. Holiday Manor Estates Club, Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 9j 25,027, at 25,297-98
(Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. Mar. 23, 1992) (appeal to the HUD Secretary); see also United
States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1994)
(reversing an "effective" denial of a motion to intervene). Furthermore, intervention in HUD
proceedings such as Holiday Manor and Soules was allowed despite the fact that the complain-
ants' motions in those cases occurred more than 30 days after the filing of the HUD charge and
therefore were beyond the period defined as timely by HUD's own regulation. See Holiday
Manor Estates Club, Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 1 25,027, at 25,297-98 (allowing inter-
vention to prevent prejudice to complainant when HUD unexpectedly abandoned one of com-
plainant's "major contentions"); HUD v. Downs, Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 25,017, at
25,235 (Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. Nov. 22, 1991) (expanding the 30 day period by authority
of another regulation that permits ALJ enlargement of time periods "where necessary to avoid
prejudicing the public interest or the rights of the parties" (citing 24 C.F.R. § 104.30(b))), affd
sub nom. Soules v. HUD, 967 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1992).
274 For an example of judicial forgiveness of a rather substantial delay in a complainant's
intervention motion after the conflict-of-interests problem became known, see Country Club
Garden, 159 F.R.D. at 401-04.
275 See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(e) (1994) (stating that the Attorney General is authorized to inter-
vene in a private action "[u]pon timely application"); id. § 3614(e) (stating that aggrieved per-
sons are authorized to intervene in "pattern or practice" and certain other actions brought by the
Attorney General "[u]pon timely application").
276 See id. § 3612(c), (o)(2). This argument was made in Country Club Garden but the
court, finding the intervention motion to be timely, did not have to address it. See Country Club
Garden, 159 F.R.D. at 403-04.
277 See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980). In General Telephone, the Supreme
Court held that the 1972 amendments to Title VII authorizing the EEOC to bring "class" suits
on behalf of persons aggrieved by illegal employment discrimination were not subject to the
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FHAA is not at all clear on this matter, and the fact that the HUD regula-
tions do impose a timeliness requirement on intervention in ALT cases sug-
gests that such a requirement is not inconsistent with the statute.278 At the
very least, therefore, the timeliness requirement of Rule 24 and the HUD
regulations pose a potential problem for complainants who seek to protect
their interests by attempting to intervene at a late stage of an FHAA case.
Furthermore, even if an aggrieved person is always allowed to intervene,
the delay between the time when that person's interests diverge from those
of the government and the moment when intervention is achieved may un-
dercut a complainant's ability to protect his or her interests. The danger of
this type of prejudice to the complainant's interests would occur in every
situation in which the assertion of a right or interest-such as the jury trial
demand in the Country Club Garden case-depends on meeting a time dead-
line.279 It might also arise in cases in which the failure to take early action-
such as deposing an about-to-be-unavailable witness who is crucial to the
complainant's claim for damages-cannot be fully remedied at a later stage
of the case. And it would occur in virtually every case in which the diver-
gence of interests arises after a judgment is rendered by the trial court or
AU-as in Presidio, Soules, and Baumgardner-because at that point, the
ability of a complainant to pursue or participate effectively in an appeal will
likely be compromised unless he or she has already become a party to the
case in the proceedings below.
Protection against this kind of prejudice to the complainant is a neces-
sary third element of a workable triangular relationship under the FHAA.
The complainant must obtain party status early enough in the case so that
assertion of the complainant's particular interests may be made in an effec-
tive manner. Because it is impossible to predict in advance what these inter-
ests will be and how they might eventually diverge from those of the
government, the only way to guarantee that the complainant's interests will
requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that govern private class
actions. See id. at 326. This holding was based on the statutory language of the 1972 amend-
ments, the legislative intent underlying these amendments, and the overall design of the enforce-
ment procedures reflected in these amendments. See id. at 326-29. In holding that Rule 23 is not
applicable to an enforcement action brought by the EEOC, the Court set forth a general policy
against allowing technical procedural rules to hinder the effective enforcement of civil rights
statutes: "We are reluctant, absent clear congressional guidance, to subject [EEOC 'class'] ac-
tions to requirements that might disable the enforcement agency from advancing the public in-
terest in the manner and to the extent contemplated by the statute." Id. at 331.
278 HUD's regulations interpreting the FHAA are entitled to deference as long as they are
based on a permissible construction of the statute. See Presidio, 4 F.3d at 809; NAACP v. Amer-
ican Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1992). See generally Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (stating that courts
should defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes). Given the ambiguity in the
FHAA concerning whether intervention in ALT proceedings and election cases must be timely,
HUD's regulation on this point would likely be determinative that such a timeliness requirement
does, in fact, attach to these intervention motions.
279 For example, trial by jury in a federal civil case is waived unless a demand therefor is
made within 10 days after service of the last pleading directed to an issue that is triable of right
by a jury. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
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not be prejudiced by a delay in obtaining party status is to provide for this
intervention at the beginning of the case.
The solution, therefore, is for Congress to amend the FHAA to provide
for automatic intervention on behalf of aggrieved persons after the charge is
filed in HUD proceedings and after the complaint is filed in elected cases.280
Automatic intervention at the initial stage of a HUD proceeding or elected
case would not change the basic relationship between an aggrieved person
and the government lawyer working on his behalf; it would merely reflect
adoption of the shifting model of representation discussed above. As in the
past, most cases would continue to be prosecuted solely by government law-
yers for the benefit of both the government and the private complainant.
This would only change when and if conflicts arose and the complainant
chose to retain private counsel. The only difference occasioned by automatic
intervention would be that when a divergence of interests between the ag-
grieved person and the government does occur, that problem could be solved
quickly and without the possible prejudice to the complainant from delay.
Without automatic intervention, however, the risk that an aggrieved person's
interests will be inadequately protected by his or her government lawyer will
continue to exist in every HUD-charged case under the FHAA.
C. Congressional Choice
The ultimate responsibility for structuring the relationship between gov-
ernment lawyers and the aggrieved persons for whom they act under the
FHAA lies with Congress-the only entity with the power to establish and
adjust this relationship in virtually any way it chooses.281 Thus far, however,
the congressional guidance on this subject has been quite limited, consisting
only of what may be inferred from the statutory language that was adopted in
1988 to establish the HUD enforcement scheme. This language simply calls
for HUD and DOJ lawyers to act "on behalf of" aggrieved persons in HUD
proceedings and elected cases and also allows such persons to intervene in
these cases3m In the absence of a more explicit directive calling for govern-
ment lawyers to "represent" private complainants in a full-fledged lawyer-
client relationship, it was perhaps inevitable that HUD and DOJ lawyers
would come to view their only real "client" in these cases as the government.
To the extent that this system has led to situations in which aggrieved persons
have received less satisfactory representation than the 1988 Congress in-
tended, the only solution is for a subsequent Congress to indicate more ex-
plicitly how it wants this relationship to be adjusted.
Congress has, in fact, considered a number of proposals to amend the
FHAA in recent years,283 but none has directly addressed the issue of repre-
280 A less dramatic amendment would be for Congress to declare that intervention in these
cases need not be "timely," see supra notes 275-278 and accompanying text, but this would not
solve the problem of potential prejudice from a delayed intervention as well as automatic inter-
vention would.
281 See supra notes 72-76,79, 186 and accompanying text (discussing various statutory mod-
els adopted by Congress for providing lawyers for particular groups in the society).
282 See supra notes 48-54, 59 and accompanying text.
283 These proposals have included: (1) easing the qualification requirements for the "hous-
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sentation. The most important proposal relating to the FHAA's enforcement
scheme, appearing as a little-debated provision of the 1996 appropriations
bills for HUD and certain other agencies, called for all of HUD's fair-housing
activities to be transferred to the Justice Department.284 No Congressional
hearings were held on this transfer proposal, which was opposed by both
HUD and Justice. 85 The only rationale offered for the proposal-to achieve
consistency in federal civil rights enforcement policy-appeared in a small
section of the conference report that accompanied the overall appropriations
bill.286 The House and Senate passed this bill in late 1995,2 7 but President
Clinton vetoed it on grounds unrelated to its fair housing provisions. 28 8 A
few months later, a similar transfer provision was included in both the
House- and Senate-passed versions of a new omnibus appropriations bill.
Under pressure from the White House and in response to opposition from
civil rights and business groups, however, the House and Senate conferees
eventually dropped this provision from the bill that ultimately became law. 28 9
ing for older persons" exemption to the FHAA's prohibitions against familial status discrimina-
tion, see H.R. 606, 104th Cong. (1995); (2) defining more precisely what would qualify for the
"reasonable occupancy standard" exemption from the FHAA's prohibitions, see H.R. 3385,
104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 2406, 104th Cong. § 508 (1996) (incorporating, in a late amendment,
the text of H.R. 3385 into H.R. 2406); (3) barring HUD from applying the FHA to cases involv-
ing insurance discrimination, see S. REP. No. 104-140, at 76 (1995) (reporting on then section 218
of House Bill 2099, which was struck by a later amendment, see 141 CONG. REC. 14355-64
(1995)); and (4) limiting the Justice Department's use of the disparate impact theory of discrimi-
nation in "pattern or practice" cases, see H.R. 1699, 104th Cong. § 4(c) (1995). See also infra
note 284 and accompanying text (citing bills that propose to transfer all fair housing activities to
DOJ). Thus far, only the first of these proposals-H.R. 660, the "Housing for Older Persons Act
of 1995"-has been enacted. See Pub. L. No. 104-76, 109 Stat. 787 (1995) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(c), (5)).
284 See H.R. 3019, 104th Cong. § 223 (1996); H.R. 2099, 104th Cong. § 223E (1995).
285 See House, Senate Call for Transferring HUD's Fair Housing Role to DOJ, 6 [Bulletin 5]
Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 5.2, at 4 (May 1, 1996).
286 See H.R. Co~N. REP. No. 104-353, at 59 (1995). According to this report, the transfer
was based on the notion that "the Department of Justice with its own significant (and primary)
responsibilities to address all forms of discrimination represents the appropriate place to consoli-
date and to provide consistency in policy direction for the federal government to combat dis-
crimination, including discrimination with regard to housing issues." Id Noting that many
members of Congress at the time advocated the complete elimination of HUD, the conference
report also stated that "transfer of HUD's fair housing programs to the Department of Justice
will allow HUD to refocus on its primary responsibilities of providing housing and community
development assistance" and would allow Congress to deal with the larger issue of determining
HUD's fate at another time. Id
287 See 141 CONG. REC. S14389 (daily ed. Sept. 27,1995) (Senate passage); 141 CONG. REc.
H8052 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (House passage).
. 288 President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the
Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agen-
cies Appropriations Act, 1996, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 2199 (Dec. 18, 1995).
289 See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321. For a description of the opposition to the transfer proposal by civil
rights and business groups and the White House, see Congress Drops Plan to Transfer HUD's
Fair Housing Role to DOJ, 11 [Bulletin 7] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 91
7.3, at 5 (July 1, 1996); House, Senate Call for Trdnsferring HUD's Fair Housing Role to DOJ,
supra note 285, at 4.
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This performance of the 1995-1996 Congress is not encouraging to those
who seek additional congressional guidance on the problems discussed in this
Article. The 104th Congress came very close to making a major change in
the FHAA's enforcement system. It did this without holding hearings on or
providing any detailed rationale for this change, much less supplying any new
guidance on the issue of what relationship government lawyers and aggrieved
persons should have under the FHAA.
This unfortunate legislative experience, however, may eventually pro-
duce a positive result. If the concerns underlying the 1995-1996 transfer pro-
posal exist in a future Congress,290 those concerns might manifest themselves
in public hearings that could result in a deliberative examination of the
FHAA enforcement scheme. Such hearings might, in turn, address the
proper relationship between government lawyers and their private "clients,"
and in particular, the need to provide automatic intervention or another ap-
propriate mechanism to ensure the proper representation of aggrieved per-
sons in FHAA cases.
Conclusion
In the FHAA, Congress added "teeth" to the federal fair housing law by
creating a new enforcement system for administrative complaints that calls
for government lawyers to prosecute cases on behalf of private individuals
aggrieved by discriminatory housing practices. This system has had the de-
sired effect of producing a substantially elevated complaint load, which has
led to the filing of hundreds of charged cases. These cases are then tried
either by HUD lawyers before HUD AL~s, by Justice Department lawyers in
federal court, or by lawyers employed by state and local governments in the
agencies or courts of those jurisdictions.
In virtually every one of these cases, the potential exists that the inter-
ests of the private complainant may diverge from those of the government
agency that employs the prosecuting attorney. This situation raises serious
professional issues for the government lawyers involved. Although many of
these cases have been concluded satisfactorily without any conflicts develop-
ing, a number produced serious divergence-of-interest problems. In the cases
in which the divergence problem became real, HUD and Justice Department
lawyers have invariably responded by identifying their sole "client" as the
government and abandoning the private complainant on whose behalf they
have been working, albeit with an effort to alert the complainant of the need
to secure private counsel and to intervene in the case to protect his or her
interests.
The basic problem in all of these cases is that Congress created a system
of triangular representation in the FHAA without providing sufficient gui-
dance to the government lawyers as to how they should resolve conflicts of
interest between their agency-employers and the private individuals on
290 The principal proponents of the 1995-1996 transfer proposal were Congressman Jerry
Lewis (R.-Cal.) and Senator Christopher S. Bond (R.-Mo.), the respective chairs of the House
and Senate appropriations subcommittees dealing with HUD during 1995-1996. They serve in
those same capacities in the 1997-1998 Congress.
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whose behalf they are directed to act. Although Congress was concerned
with the plight of aggrieved persons whose inability to secure private counsel
was undercutting enforcement of the FHA, and although the FHAA, by pro-
viding government lawyers to pursue private interests, went further than any
other comparable civil enforcement scheme, Congress stopped short of di-
recting HUD and DOJ lawyers to "represent" private complainants to the
point of ignoring the interests of their agency-employers. Under these cir-
cumstances, it was inevitable that government lawyers would view their pri-
mary responsibility as representing the government and would therefore
provide less in the way of representation for private complainants than these
individuals or Congress might reasonably have expected.
The result is a less than satisfactory system for using government lawyers
to help private complainants enforce the FHA. Congress could remedy this
problem by providing more explicit directions to the lawyers involved as to
how the problems created by the FHAA's triangular representation system
should be resolved. If this asks too much of a legislative process whose re-
cent history suggests that focused, rational attention to this problem is un-
likely to occur, then Congress should at least amend the FHAA to provide
for automatic intervention by aggrieved persons at the beginning of all HUD-
charged cases.
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